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In recent decades, market ideas and practices have increasingly en-
croached on activities previously organised by different logics, primar-
ily the bureaucratic logic of the public sector and the associational
logics of churches and non-government organisations. One highly vis-
ible trend has been privatisation of public assets. Universally accessed
public utilities in telecommunications, energy and water have been sold
off, along with publicly owned financial institutions and transport car-
riers. Less visible, but no less important, has been the marketisation
of publicly funded social services. The growing use of contracts, com-
petition, and quasi-vouchers to allocate funds and service users to the
organisations that provide services are examples of this development.
Another has been the disproportionate growth of the share of for-profit
providers in Australia’s mixed economy of social services.
In Australian social policy, market practices and organisations have
played an increasingly significant role in shaping the delivery of ser-
vices, but in ways that ordinary voters may not identify as connected
to ‘privatisation’, understood as asset sales. Asset sales have also taken
place in social services (for example, publicly owned residential care fa-
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cilities have been sold to private organisations), but other marketising
instruments have been more common. For example, child and family
welfare services, such as foster care placement, have been contracted
out to private providers in several states. User fees have increased
households’ contributions to the cost of many social services. And,
across child care, school education, health care and superannuation,
public policies have promoted the growth of private provision.
Marketisation has changed the texture of social services, pushing
service users into new roles and relationships with the state (see, for ex-
ample, Carney and Proctor & Aitchison, this volume). These changes
raise important questions about the trajectory of the social service
system. This chapter first describes the process of marketisation in Aus-
tralian policy then explores how the public has responded. It begins
with an account of the pressures that led governments of divergent po-
litical persuasions to introduce marketising policies and then offers an
overview of asset sales and service marketisation in Australia during
the last 25 years. Finally it explores how the Australian public has re-
sponded not only to visible marketisation via asset sales but also to
the less visible processes that are reorganising social services. Do vot-
ers recognise the trend to private provision and what do they think
about it? Do voters endorse privately run services of all kinds? Are there
pressures emerging within this model of service provision? Answering
these questions helps identify the future tension points within a more
privatised system of social services.
Pressures on the state for privatisation and marketisation
A dynamic view of market encroachment, addressing the why as well
as the what, must engage with the politics of this process: why policy-
makers decide to sell assets, contract out and offer quasi-vouchers, and
how they rationalise these decisions on one hand, and how the public
has responded on the other. Table 1.1 sets out some of the internal and
external pressures that encourage greater privatisation of assets, and in-
creasingly, marketisation of social services.
In the 1980s, policymakers in both centre-right and centre-left
governments around the world began to look to the market for solu-
tions when the institutions of state management of the private economy
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Table 1.1: Pressures on the state for privatisation and marketisation
Internal pressures (politics
and bureaucracy)
External pressures (business,
consumers, voters, media)
Asset sales • Pragmatic need to finance
budget deficits
• Overlapping political and
business networks that
favour, gain from privatisa-
tion
• Response to ‘overburdened’
state – bureaucratic and po-
litical interest in shifting
blame for utility and service
failures
• Strong ideological and ad-
ministrative framework in
the benefits of systemic
market provision among
bureaucratic and political
elites (‘new public manage-
ment’ [NPM], for instance)
• Corporate interest in asset
acquisition
• Financial markets seeking
assets and pressuring for
market reforms
• Media-publicised consumer
and business dissatisfaction
with inefficient state-owned
utilities
• Class interest in de-unioni-
sation and reducing the size
of the public sector
Service
marketisation
• Resource constraints that
favour cheaper, contracted
services
• Overlapping political and
business networks that
favour and gain from mar-
ketisation
• Bureaucratic and political
interest in shifting respon-
sibility for (failures in)
social provision
• NPM framework that
favours ‘steering’ not ‘row-
ing’ (cost control,
competition) and individu-
alised modes of provision
• Public pressure to finance
(expensive) social services
• Increasing business interest
in the social service ‘mar-
ket’
• Media-publicised consumer
dissatisfaction with publicly
provided social services
and the public sector came under pressure from slow growth, inflation
and rising unemployment. The privatisation response was prompted by
a number of influences. Some pressure for privatisation was fairly prag-
matic: with no great attachment to ownership, privatisation emerged as
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an administrative option to raise resources to fund budget deficits and
to resolve management problems of large state utilities (see Feigenbaum
& Henig 1994, p. 187).
But the privatisation agenda had deeper political significance. Gov-
ernments and market actors often have overlapping ideological and
financial interests in increasing the scope of the market at the expense
of the public sector. McAllister and Studlar argue that privatisation was
driven by elites seeking either greater commercial access to public as-
sets and services or, more ideologically, greater popular participation in
a new ‘property-owning democracy’ (1989, p. 158). The authors make
clear that, despite the rhetoric of participatory capitalism, ‘privatisation
is a policy which did not emerge because of popular demands among
voters; rather, privatisation was a product of elites’ (1989, p. 174).
Exceeding mere advocacy for privatisation on the basis of appar-
ently ‘neutral’ economics, business organisations, thinktanks, political
parties, and government leaders in many countries launched political
programs for public asset sales that would ‘realign institutions and
decision-making processes so as to privilege the goals of some groups
over the competing aspirations of other groups’ (Feigenbaum & Henig
1994, p. 191). Feigenbaum and Henig (1994) develop a typology of the
political underpinnings of privatisation that helps us understand why
and how governments use it. They argue that pragmatic privatisations
are typically understood by those undertaking them as a technical so-
lution to an immediate problem. Tactical privatisation is directed at
achieving party political goals in the short term, including attracting
allies and rewarding supporters. Systematic privatision, as the name
suggests, seeks to transform economic and political institutions and
interests more comprehensively. Describing systematic privatisation,
Feigenbaum and Henig state that ‘the withdrawal of the state results in a
substantial and not readily reversible decrease in the power of working
classes relative to that of organized elites’ and may also involve a ‘values’
shift that promotes ‘a shrinking of the sphere of activities considered
to be legitimate areas for public scrutiny and intervention’ (1994, p.
200). Furthermore, systemic privatisation may entail ‘nontransient re-
structuring of the institutional arrangements of the society … so that
the array of incentives presented to individuals and groups encourages
a greater reliance on private and market-oriented solutions’ (1994, p.
201). No doubt, these institutional and value shifts both promoted and
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were reinforced further by the internal reorganisation of the public sec-
tor. The adoption of ‘new public management’ thinking by public sector
managers committed to private sector managerial styles and ‘public ser-
vice provision by private organizations’ (Hood 2002, p. 12,554) helped
normalise privatising strategies.
The most dramatic examples of systemic privatisation followed the
collapse of command economies in the Soviet-dominated world in the
late 1980s, which precipitated and normalised subsequent mass pri-
vatisation in that region. This huge experiment in rapid transfer of
public assets to the private sector had disastrous consequences, from
the entrenchment of the financial and political power of oligarchs to
the mortality crisis1 caused by the mass job loss that characterised tran-
sition across the former Soviet bloc (Stuckler, King & McKee 2009).
The collapse of the Soviet model also further undermined the ‘mixed
economy’ models in Western Europe and the English-speaking democ-
racies. In these countries, public ownership of several industries had
long been accepted on the grounds of natural monopoly or public in-
terest. However, this state of affairs came under strong political attack,
particularly during Conservative Prime Minister Thatcher’s rule in the
United Kingdom during the 1980s.
Privatisation programs under the British Conservatives, Australian
Labor and the French Socialists, for example, have all involved over-
lapping pragmatic, tactical and systematic objectives. Feigenbaum and
Henig’s (1994) analysis focuses on objectives defined internally within
governments, which attract interest from bureaucrats, budget-minded
politicians and reformers. More recently, research has emphasised the
role of external pressures and interests in sustaining and deepening the
privatisation agenda. Financialisation has increased the power of mar-
ket actors who have an interest in asset sales and service marketisation.
The rapid accumulation and internationalisation of private financial
assets in recent decades has created a massive pool of private funds
seeking investment opportunities, while pressures on public finances –
partly created by tax cuts on high-income earners and corporations –
1 In an article in The Lancet, Stucker and colleagues find that ‘Mass privatisation
programmes were associated with an increase in short-term adult male mortality
rates of 12.8%’ and that ‘One mediating factor could be male unemployment rates,
which were increased substantially by mass privatisation’ (2009, p. 399).
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have led governments to reconsider the size and structure of their bud-
gets and balance sheets. In this context, as Huffschmid (2008, p. 220)
puts it, ‘privatisation appears to be a solution to the problems of both
the wealthy and the state: it gives the former a new area for investment,
while at the same time easing the financial burden on the latter’.
Indeed, new capitalist actors have come to specialise in gaining
ownership of government-run assets and access to publicly funded ser-
vices. Australia’s Macquarie Bank, for example, largely built its interna-
tional market position on the basis of handling Australia’s energy, trans-
port and road infrastructure privatisations. One journalist remarked
that the bank had become ‘[a]n unelected elite making big money from
handling what the public used to own: it’s a target-rich environment,
if ever there was’ (Haigh 2007, p. 33). Macquarie Bank also has sub-
stantial investments in publicly funded aged care services. As Crouch
notes, firms engaged in privatisation and marketisation go on to culti-
vate very specialist capacities for dealing with the privatisation process:
‘the core business of these firms is not therefore the substantive activity;
providing defence equipment does not have much to do with educating
children. … The core business is the art of winning government con-
tracts’ (2013, p. 228). On the other side, public sector organisations and
managers have also steadily built up skills and techniques in contract
management.
The next two sections provide an indicative overview of how these
pressures to sell public assets and marketise social services have played
out in Australia since the 1980s. Although not comprehensive, this
historical sketch demonstrates the complex politics and process of mar-
ketisation, as governments and oppositions seek to realise their ideolo-
gies while managing public expectations, the electoral cycle and fiscal
and institutional constraints.2 And although our primary interest is so-
cial policy, we begin with asset privatisation because it is useful for
2 Our overview is necessarily selective; for more detail, see Aulich and O’Flynn
(2007a, 2007b), Colley and Head (2013), Fairbrother and colleagues (2002),
Walker and Walker (2008), and ‘Privatisation: a review of the Australian
experience’, a special issue of Growth, the journal of the Committee for the
Economic Development of Australia, edited by Margaret Mead and Glen Withers
(2002). The sources we cite in this section also deal with particular dimensions of
the topic in detail.
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understanding the parallel process of change in social services, in which
market encroachment is less immediately visible.
Asset sales in Australia: what has happened and why
Early rationales for asset privatisation
In Australia, extensive public development of economic infrastructure,
for example, utilities, transport, communications and financial services,
had its roots in colonial history and was essential to nation building
during the first three-quarters of the 20th century (Aulich & O’Flynn
2007a, pp. 371–72). However, this began to change as privatisation
came squarely onto the policy agenda in the early 1980s, with the re-
lease by the Liberal–Country Party Coalition government (1975–83) of
the report of the Committee of Review of Commonwealth Functions
(soon known by its critics as the Razor Gang). In his ministerial state-
ment on the report’s release in April 1981, Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser outlined the government’s objectives under the heading ‘Trans-
fer of functions to the private sector’. These were:
strengthening private economic activity and the influence of individ-
uals over the economy through their choices in the market place. In
the view of the Government, activities of a commercial kind are gen-
erally best performed in the private sector, where they are open to
greater influence from consumers and to the disciplines of competi-
tion (Fraser 1981, p. 1,832).
Announced reforms included asset sales, contracting out, and encour-
agement of private sector involvement in a wide range of activities.
In his endorsement of the report, then-Treasurer John Howard argued
that Fraser’s ‘statement and the response of the Opposition have
demonstrated what a sharp philosophical difference there is between
we on this side of the House and the Opposition about the size and role
of government in Australia’ (Howard 1981, p. 1,986).
As it happened, the Review of Commonwealth Functions was more
aspirational than effectual as a marketisation manifesto, not least be-
cause the Fraser government lost power early in 1983. Despite Mr
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Howard’s remarks on party differences, it was Labor governments led
by Bob Hawke (1983–91) and Paul Keating (1991–96) that began di-
vesting public properties and eventually government business enter-
prises. Nevertheless, the ALP was never united on privatisation, and
some researchers argue that its asset sales were ‘pragmatic’ rather than
ideological (Aulich & O’Flynn 2007a; see also Feigenbaum & Henig
1994, p. 194). Still, over 13 years in government, Labor clearly moved
away from its pronounced ideological hostility to privatisation.
Researchers have pointed to a range of structural and contingent
causes behind this shift in Labor’s approach. One was the strong pull of
neoliberal ideas on Labor, a social democratic party that found itself in
office dealing with economic stagnation in ways that compromised its
traditional redistributive goals (Lavelle 2005). Another was the grow-
ing influence, or at least receptive disposition, of neoclassically trained
‘econocrats’ in the federal bureaucracy (Hawker 2006; Pusey 1991).
Public service reforms also gave unprecedented influence to policy en-
trepreneurs within the formal policy process, as the use of ministerial
advisors and consultants became institutionalised (Hawker 2006). Ac-
cording to Geoffrey Hawker (2006), former merchant banker David
Block, who was appointed to lead an ‘Efficiency Scrutiny Unit’ in the
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in September, 1986 was
particularly important during the Hawke years.3 Hawker argues that
Block drove the marketisation agenda behind the scenes, following the
crisis precipitated by a collapse in the terms of trade in 1986. This
agenda included asset sales as well as the comprehensive introduction
of commercial principles into the internal operation of the Common-
wealth public service (Hawker 2006; Holmes & Wileman 1997).
Overall, then, it seems that economic crisis and the rising influence
of small government ideas conspired to generate political and policy
opportunities for market encroachment. Practically, this resulted in La-
3 A media report at the time collected several quotations from Prime Minister
Bob Hawke extolling Mr Block’s virtues and efforts, among which were: ‘I wanted
to get the toughest, leanest, meanest, most efficient bloke in the private sector, and
bring him into the Australian public service to undertake a series of efficiency
scrutiny surveys’ and ‘I pay tribute to the magnificent work that he has already
done in, bringing to an examination of the practices of the Commonwealth public
service, the rigours of the private sector’ (Stephens 1987).
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bor committing to balance budgets without raising taxes as a share of
GDP, as part of the ‘Trilogy’ announced in the 1985–86 budget (Head
1988). Inevitably, this commitment would create multiple pressures for
budget restraint and hence further policy reform, including the use of
private providers in social services and the eventual sale of assets. These
asset sales would help Labor to reduce budget deficits, fund popular
programs, and avoid future capital expenditure on state-owned assets.
Given the lack of internal consensus in favour of this approach, it
took a series of political and financial crises to give the ALP leader-
ship the political authority to push major privatisation. In 1987, Prime
Minister Hawke had unsuccessfully sought the approval of the ALP Na-
tional Conference for asset sales (Goldfinch 1999, p. 14). Three years
later, the impending collapse of the State Bank of Victoria (SVA),
caused by the failure of its merchant banking arm, Tricontinental,
opened the way for the partial privatisation of the Commonwealth
Bank (CBA). Raising equity through privatisation enabled Treasurer
Keating to sell part of the CBA and use the funds to purchase (rescue)
the SVA (The Economist 1990). After the proverbial privatisation horse
had bolted, a special party conference in September 1990 approved the
sale of Australian Airlines and 49 percent of Qantas (Goldfinch 1999,
pp. 13–14) and these, along with a range of other specialised defence
and research organisations were sold over the subsequent years. To-
gether, sales under Labor raised well over $6 billion (Aulich & O’Flynn
2007a); see Table 1.2. Other sales were announced but not carried out;
yet others were carried over into the Howard era (Hawker 2006, pp.
250–51).
By the mid-1990s, the Labor government had overseen a transi-
tion in which market encroachment into the public sector had become
part of normal policy. Most indicative was the Keating Labor gov-
ernment’s active pursuit of National Competition Policy (NCP) in the
early–mid-1990s. This was an ambitious blueprint for microeconomic
reform prepared by a committee of inquiry chaired by management
professor Fred Hilmer in 1993 (Commonwealth of Australia 1993).
NCP was agreed by the state and Commonwealth governments in 1995.
It amounted to a framework for marketisation through microeconomic
reform of government business enterprises (many of which were owned
by the states) and in the economy more broadly, mandated via changes
to the Trade Practices Act 1974. The policy’s organising principles were
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Table 1.2: Indicative summary of asset sales, federal and state governments,
1987–2013. For sources and notes, see appendix at the end of the chapter
Jurisdiction Party of
government(a)
Year Asset Proceeds
($m)
1988 Defence Service House
Corporation Loan Portfo-
lio
1,515
1993, 1995 Qantas 2,115
1993 Commonwealth Bank
(first tranche)
1,700
ALP
1988–95 Other 1,037
1996 Commonwealth Bank
(second tranche)
5,100
1997 Melbourne, Brisbane and
Perth airports
3,337
1997–2006 Telstra (three tranches) 45,200
2002 Sydney Airport 4,233
Federal
Coalition
1996–2004 Other 3,781
Coalition 1989–95 State bank, investment
and insurer, grain han-
dling
1,943
1995–98 Tab Ltd, Axiom Funds
Management
1,177ALP
2010 NSW Lotteries 1,011
2012 Kurnell desalination plant
(50 yr lease)
2,300
2013 Port Botany, Port Kembla
(99 yr leases)
5,000
NSW
Coalition
2013 Electricity generators 160
ALP 1994 Gladstone Power Station 750
National (b) 1996–2000 TabQ, Bank of Qld,Suncorp-Metway/QIDC,
State Gas Pipeline
2,878
Qld
ALP 2010 Queensland Rail 4,600
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Jurisdiction Party of
government(a)
Year Asset Proceeds
($m)
2010–11 Other (Abbot Pt Coal ter-
minal, infrastructure and
resource assets)
4,500
Labor 1992–93 Sagasco, SA Financing
Trust
451
1994–96 State Bank of South Aus-
tralia
730
1994–2000 Other infrastructure and
resource assets
719
SA
Liberal (c)
1999 Esta Power and Power
Utilities
3,500
Liberal 1993 State insurance office 42Tas.
Labor 2005 Hydro’s Roaring Forties
wind energy generation
(50%)
110
Electricity industry 22,522Vic. Liberal (d) 1992–98
Other (incl. Tabcorp,
ports, grain handling,
State Insurance Office)
1,227
Labor 1993 State Govt Insurance Of-
fice
165WA
Liberal 1993–2000 Dampier-Bunbury Nat-
ural Gas Pipeline,
AlintaGas, Bank West,
other
4,129
contestability, which warranted the break-up of monopolies, and com-
petitive neutrality, which meant in practice that the public sector could
not receive special treatment or protection in economic transactions.
Removal of a range of industry-specific protections under NCP angered
farmers and small business owners, raising doubt about the viability
of rural communities (Boswell 1996).4 At the same time, NCP judged
4 National Party senator Ron Boswell spoke on behalf of these constituencies in
this critical assessment of NCP. Later, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party would
be a beneficiary of small business and rural hostility to NCP (van Fossen 1998).
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public sector subsidies to assist less well-off consumers and clients to
be inefficient and uncompetitive, a move that raised concerns about
the policy’s impact on poorer Australians (Carver 1996). As we discuss
later, this model for marketising public services has had a very sig-
nificant impact on social service provision through the expansion of
contracting out, including increased use of mechanisms such as com-
petitive tendering.
Howard’s privatisation program
Under John Howard’s Coalition government (1996–2007), market en-
croachment on the public sector was pursued in all its forms at the
federal level (Aulich & O’Flynn 2007a). The new government convened
a National Commission of Audit, in the tradition of the Fraser gov-
ernment’s Review of Government Functions and in keeping with its
election promise. The Commission’s terms of reference and underpin-
ning principles were informed by market logic: to identify whether or
not the federal government should be involved in the activities in which
it was involved.5 Its report included the recommendation that ‘The
Government should shut down or sell public sector assets where there
appears to be no public interest reason for continued government own-
ership’ (National Commission of Audit 1996, recommendation 3.4).
The definition of public interest was correspondingly narrow.
The Howard government ran with this advice. Between 1996 and
2006, it sold the remainder of the Commonwealth Bank, Telstra, most
major and minor airports, the National Rail Corporation, and Aus-
tralian Defence Industries, among other assets, which, at a total of more
than $61 billion, yielded nearly 10 times more than earlier sales under
Labor (Aulich & O’Flynn 2007a, appendix 2). The Howard government
5 According to Hawke and Wanna (2010, p. 71) the recommendations of the
Commission of Audit were more ‘managerial than neoliberal, oriented towards
doing more with less and improving “value for money” . . . based on a
presumption that program managers (spenders) would manage their own budgets
better’. The distinction between managerial and neoliberal is valid, albeit rather
fine. David Block’s proposals, which used private sector models to reform the
public sector, were based on the same assumptions (Hawker 2006), and asset sales
and other marketising reforms are prominent among the commission’s
recommendations.
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also embarked on a massive program of contracting out of IT and other
‘non-core’ services from the federal public sector (Aulich & O’Flynn
2007a; Australian Public Service Commission 2003; Pittard 2007).
Coalition policy towards privatisation clearly followed the Liberal
Party’s stronger embrace of free-market economics, most forcefully ex-
pressed in the Fightback! program of 1991 (Liberal Party of Australia
1991). Still, mass privatisation needed public legitimation, and the
question was central in the election of 1996. In 1988, around the time
that the ALP had begun selling off some Commonwealth assets, public
support for whole or part privatisation of Telstra was measured at 61
percent (Goot 1999, p. 217). However, by 1996, when the Coalition un-
der John Howard’s leadership was seeking election on a platform that
included privatising Telstra, support for the sale had fallen to 33 percent
(Goot 1999, p. 217). Thus, the Coalition needed to manage the electoral
risk of persisting with privatisation, and the related problem of National
Party resistance to a reform with the potential to hurt rural communi-
ties. As Goot (1999) argued at the time, Howard crafted a complex and
electorally successful strategy to neutralise criticism from the left. He
promised funds from the Telstra sale to undertake environmental pro-
jects, while also making the (now credible) argument that Labor would
privatise anyway.
The Liberals also actively promoted privatisation by encouraging
small ‘mums and dads’ shareholders to buy shares in the staged privati-
sation of Telstra. Designed to appeal to middle-class and aspirational
Coalition voters, this strategy repositioned the sale of major public as-
sets as a step towards genuine popular ownership. In his closing address
to the Liberal Party’s 1998 national convention, John Howard exalted
popular share ownership as his ‘great goal’ for the future:
just as Robert Menzies made Australia the greatest home-owning
democracy in the Western world, so it is my goal that my Govern-
ment will make Australia the greatest share-owning democracy in
the world. Already we have sold one-third of Telstra and we’re along
the way towards that goal … we have made a firm policy decision,
that if re-elected we will proceed to allow the people of Australia, the
men and women of Australia, to buy the remaining two-thirds of Tel-
stra (Howard 1998).
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To overcome National Party resistance, the Coalition restricted foreign
ownership in Telstra (just as the ALP had restricted foreign ownership
of Qantas in 1992) so that its sale would not arouse excessive nationalist
concern about foreign takeovers of land and assets – a rallying cry of
populist right-wing resistance to free markets that continues today.6
Although privatisation was clearly and increasingly unpopular
with the electorate, the Howard government persisted with attempts to
sell assets well into its final term. It passed legislation to privatise Med-
ibank Private, a huge government-owned health insurer, late in 2006
and began to arrange the sale by share market float (Department of
Finance 2007, p. 44). Following public outcry, the sale was then post-
poned until after the 2007 election (Aulich & O’Flynn 2007b, p. 161),
which the government lost, so ‘the sale process was promptly termi-
nated’ (Department of Finance 2008, p. 49). Public opposition was also
decisive in the government’s 2006 decision not to proceed with the sale
of the Snowy Mountains hydroelectricity scheme, which was at an ad-
vanced stage of planning. In June of that year, the sale of this ‘Vegemite
of national infrastructure’ (Andren 2006, p. 22) was withdrawn. The
prime minister justified the decision by saying that ‘The decision to
sell has created a lot of unhappiness in the Australian community right
across the political spectrum. I am not such a zealot about privatisation
that you sell everything under the sun irrespective of the circumstances’
(Howard 2006).7
The return of Coalition government in 2013 – and of privatisation
The final asset sales planned by the Howard government did not go
ahead, and during the years of ALP federal government under Kevin
Rudd (2007–10, 2013) and Julia Gillard (2010–13), privatisation, at
least in the form of public asset sales, was off the agenda. The GFC may
6 Chan (2013) describes the ‘explosive entry’ of the issue of foreign ownership,
especially of land, into the 2013 federal election campaign.
7 With an election coming, in the same press conference, Mr Howard also
admitted to succumbing to the persuasion of his cabinet colleague, member for
the bellwether seat of Eden-Monaro, to withdraw the proposal. He also blamed the
NSW Labor government, a major shareholder in the Snowy Mountain scheme, for
proposing the sale in the first place (Howard 2006).
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have had a role here, as Labor returned to a more traditional Keynesian
deficit-funded stimulus strategy (Colley & Head 2013, p. 869).
The re-election of a Liberal–National Coalition government in Sep-
tember 2013 immediately revived discussion about reducing the size of
the public sector. Further asset sales were not mentioned in the Liberal
Party’s ‘Real Solutions’ election policy statement, although the sale of
Medibank Private was foreshadowed, along with massive cuts to public
sector jobs. After winning, the government returned to the Coalition’s
longstanding marketising agenda, justified by reference to the (appar-
ent) weak fiscal position of the federal government.
Action was swift. Announced in October 2013, a ‘Commission of
Audit’ reported in February 2014 and advised the government on an
aggressive, deep and wide-ranging privatisation and outsourcing pro-
gram. Recommendation 57 of the report used the Hilmer-era idea of
‘contestability’ to justify its advocacy of short, medium and long term
privatisation of entities including the Snowy Hydro, the Mint, Defence
Housing Australia, and the National Broadband Network (National
Commission of Audit 2014, pp. 220–24). Proposals for the sale of sev-
eral of these were announced in the 2014–15 budget.
The Government had already committed itself pre-election to the
full privatisation of the largest private health provider, Medibank Pri-
vate, which was floated in November 2014 and raised the government
around $6 billion (Hartge-Hazelman & Baker 2014). This privatisation
will likely reshape how price-setting occurs in the private health insur-
ance industry, with ongoing signs the government will allow premiums
to continue to rise at a record or near-record pace (Gardner 2015).
Perhaps the most serious threat to public infrastructure emerged
with the implementation of the Asset Recycling Initiative, agreed to at
a Council of Australian Governments meeting in May 2014 (Dossor
2014). The aim of the program is to provide federal incentives for states
to privatise existing assets on the condition that the proceeds fund new
public infrastructure (Department of Infrastructure and Regional De-
velopment 2014). The success of the proposal is no doubt related to its
twin appeal to natural privatisers and those governments desperately
looking for infrastructure finance. By early 2015, the South Australian,
Victorian and Queensland governments had accelerated privatisation
plans to access these funds (two year time limit for access) (Crowe
2014). The federal government’s proposals have the potential to un-
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leash a vast program of asset transfer into private control, and to further
generate profits for private businesses involved in public-private part-
nerships financed by the sell-offs.
State governments and asset sales
State governments, which have traditionally owned utilities and which
had a major presence in insurance and banking, also began to sell off
assets in the 1990s. And, as Table 1.2 shows, over the last two decades,
at least one wave of asset sales has occurred in all states, under ALP
and Liberal governments. As with the federal sphere, fiscal difficulties
have been as much a driver as ideological zeal. Over time, rationales at
the state level have also changed, from an emphasis on debt reduction
to pleading about the need to raise revenue for infrastructure (Colley
& Head 2013). Overall, Liberal governments have privatised more and
faced less political resistance than Labor. As such, the return of Liberal
governments in Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales (NSW) af-
ter 2010 has relaunched the privatisation agenda in those states.
Some of the privatisation experiences of the Australian states are
worth chronicling in more detail. In NSW, ALP governments attempted
to continue the process of asset sales begun in the 1990s under Premier
Nick Greiner’s Liberal–National Party government, but mostly failed.
Indeed, privatisation initiatives by Labor governments in NSW faced
paralysing internal opposition. The proposed sale of electricity genera-
tors in NSW under Labor premiers Bob Carr (in 1997 and 2003) and
Morris Iemma (in 2007 and 2008) (Colley & Head 2013, p. 871) led
to serious internal party revolts, on both occasions led by the union
movement, and the sales did not go ahead. A further sell-off attempt in
2010–11, under Labor’s Premier Kristina Keneally, was also eventually
derailed with the ALP’s defeat in 2011. Given the political difficulties
Labor had faced, Liberal premier-in-waiting, Barry O’Farrell, made un-
dertakings to unions before the election not to privatise certain entities,
including water and ferries (Smith 2011). However, since the election,
a significant asset sale program has been underway, involving electric-
ity generators, a desalination plant and the three major ports of NSW
(Table 1.2 shows major sales completed between 2011 and 2013). To
carry out these large scale asset sales, the government was required to
engage in political trade-offs with minor parties (Clune 2012, p. 628).
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In the run-up to the 2015 election, Premier Baird (2014–) has fore-
shadowed the sale of further electricity assets (‘poles and wires’), but
faces strong public disapproval of the proposal (Nicholls & Hasham
2015). Meanwhile, another program of asset sales has been less visible
and so less contested. In late 2012, the NSW government established an
agency, Government Property NSW, to manage its portfolio of 200,000
properties, which have a combined value of almost $130 billion. By Feb-
ruary 2015, $1 billion worth of these properties had been sold, and
many more were slated for future sale (Knowles & McClymont 2015).
Like the major asset sales, these divestments have been consistently jus-
tified as providing funds for infrastructure development.
Victoria’s Liberal government led by Premier Jeff Kennett in
1992–99 embarked on the most ambitious program of privatisation and
outsourcing in a highly ideological response to its inherited budget and
debt problems (Robinson 1994). More than 50 government businesses
were sold, including the electricity generation sector and public trans-
port systems, yielding more revenue than the proceeds of the privatisa-
tions of all other states put together at that time (Colley & Head 2013,
p. 870). After a long period of ALP government (1999–2010) during
which privatisation was not pursued, the Victorian Liberals regained
government in 2010 and market reform returned to the centre of policy
debate.8 Although there were no major asset sales under Liberal rule,
both premiers Baillieu (2010–13) and Napthine (2013–2014) publicly
stated that privatisation was a strategy under consideration, notably
to raise revenue for infrastructure projects (Gordon 2012; Napthine &
O’Brien 2013).
Queensland came relatively late to large-scale privatisation: start-
ing small under the ALP in 1994, asset sales took off under National
Party governments between 1996 and 1998. A hiatus during ALP gov-
ernments led by Premier Peter Beattie (1998–2007) was followed by
a massive second wave of privatisation under Labor Premier Anna
Bligh (2007–12), who announced these plans after Labor won the 2009
election. These asset sales (which included Queensland Rail) were not
8 The incoming government commissioned an Independent Review of State
Finances, the report of which they considered too controversial for publication,
but which recommended very wide-ranging transfers of public responsibility to
the private sector, according to media reports (Uren 2012).
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anticipated by voters, who opposed them, and they have consistently
factored as a reason for her government’s crushing defeat in March
2012 (Quiggin 2012). Not surprisingly – against the recommendations
of its own Commission of Audit9 and in spite of an enormous par-
liamentary majority – the new Liberal–National Party government of
Premier Campbell Newman undertook not to sell any further assets
without an explicit mandate. In January 2015, however, Premier New-
man took a far-reaching privatisation plan to voters, centred on the sale
of electricity assets (Ludlow & Wiggins 2014). His party lost the elec-
tion, and Mr Newman himself lost his seat, after Labor campaigned
primarily on the privatisation issue.
In Western Australia, the first asset sale (of the State Insurance
Office in 1993) was undertaken by a Labor government, but this pri-
vatisation was overshadowed by the sweeping divestment of infrastruc-
ture, energy, banking and other assets under a Liberal government
between 1993 and 2001. Following seven years of Labor rule (2001–8),
the incoming minority Liberal government did not pursue asset sales
immediately. When Western Australia lost its AAA credit rating in
September 2013, following significant increases in the state debt, Pre-
mier Colin Barnett immediately began to discuss privatisations, despite
promises not to do so before the election in March that year (Burrell
& Taylor 2013). However, such proposals are clearly politically sensi-
tive, and he has been careful to hedge: ‘there will not be asset sales that
impact on services to the public … they will be carefully thought out’
(Burrell & Taylor 2013).
In South Australia, privatisation began in a small way under the
ALP in 1992, but proceeded apace under Liberal premier Dean Brown,
who was elected in a landslide in 1993 and claimed a mandate for
large-scale reform, including reducing public debt through asset sales
(Martin 2009, p. 141). Colley and Head suggest that when Labor re-
turned to government in 2002, ‘the privatization agenda had run its
course’ (2013, p. 870).
Federal Treasurer Hockey’s recent privatisations (noted above)
have re-opened the question of asset sales at the state level in the most
9 Premier Newman established a Commission of Audit soon after winning the
2012 election. The Commission’s report recommended further asset sales and a
variety of other marketising reforms (Queensland Commission of Audit 2013).
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comprehensive way since the introduction of NCP two decades ago.
The premiers of NSW and Queensland responded with caution, citing
the need for engaging voters before signing up to the scheme (Coorey
2013). However, with so much privatisation having already occurred,
those assets remaining in public hands increasingly seem to political
and business elites like an unexploited opportunity.
What can be concluded from this overview of Australia’s expe-
rience with privatisation? The first conclusion is that governments at
federal and state levels, on both sides of politics, privatised. They did
so often against political opposition, and typically against public opin-
ion – our focus later in this chapter. Labor in opposition at both state
and federal levels tends to oppose privatisations, with state premiers
Steve Bracks in Victoria and Wayne Goss in Queensland later express-
ing regret about the impact of privatisations they instigated on rural
rail services in their respective states. Nevertheless, Labor is inclined to
promote asset sell-offs when in government, despite voter and union
resistance. Coalition governments are persistent and successful priva-
tisers, most using a ‘commission of audit’ to frame their agenda.
The second conclusion is that, over time, rationales for privatisa-
tion change (Colley & Head 2013). At the state level, fiscal difficulties
have been a persistent rationale. Ideology has become less explicitly im-
portant, but only because the ideas behind privatisation have become
normalised in elite discourse. Moreover, in recent years, sell-offs have
been increasingly justified to voters as providing funds for much
needed infrastructure, both at the federal level and by the states, which
are responsible for three-quarters of infrastructure investment (Chan et
al. 2009, p. xvi). Once the funds are raised, infrastructure development
is increasingly undertaken through ‘public–private partnerships’, which
are a form of market encroachment by other means.
The third conclusion is that, despite difficulties encountered in pri-
vatisation, there have been no serious or programmatic proposals to
reverse privatisations of any major asset sales at either level of govern-
ment, or by either major party.
A final conclusion involves assessment of whether privatisation
has been a success on its own terms. Two main criteria have justified
privatisation: improving efficiency and raising revenue; the latter has
dominated in recent years, but the two are connected. Researchers have
found that public assets have been underpriced in Australian privati-
1 The politics of market encroachment
47
sations (Gong & Skekhar 2001), and that, because most privatisations
have not been undertaken through open subscription to an Initial Pub-
lic Offering, the windfall gains have accrued to purchasing companies,
not to individuals (Docherty & Easton 2013). In early 2008, Walker and
Con Walker estimated that the sale proceeds to date amounted to $56.2
billion, while the market value of assets sold was $151.3 billion, rep-
resenting, they argued, a transfer of $95.1 billion to the private sector
(2008, p. 20). Table 1.3 presents the current market value of a handful
of former publicly owned enterprises, to give a hint of the scale of on-
going impact on public balance sheets.
Assessing the fiscal consequences of privatisations in Australia,
taking into account the potential for efficiency gains, economists Harris
and Lye (2001, p. 319) concluded that generally, governments should
not use privatisation with the objective of raising revenue. In particular,
selling efficient and profitable government-owned enterprises is most
detrimental to the public sector and this reduction in net worth is ul-
timately borne by the taxpayer. Privatisation is a poor fiscal tool and
should not be used as a means of improving economic efficiency.
Furthermore, a program of privatisation targeting inefficient
government-owned enterprises might result in a fiscal gain, as was the
case with Telstra, Qantas and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories
(CSL). This provides more weight to the case for privatisation of in-
efficient government-owned enterprises. Too often, governments are
intent on selling profitable and competitive enterprises without suffi-
cient justification.
This nuanced view of privatisation, however, is not reflected in po-
litical debate in Australia, where asset sales are generally framed as
good economic sense. Meanwhile, public–private partnership (PPP)
arrangements, which are becoming a preferred model of infrastructure
development following privatisation, also raise public interest concerns.
Infrastructure PPPs give governments political opportunities, not least
because they ‘are not recorded on government balance sheets, bypass-
ing expenditure controls and reducing parliamentary and public
scrutiny of projects’ (Chan et al. 2009, p. 143). PPPs also provide lu-
crative opportunities to businesses in the finance sector as well as in
construction. Critics point out that ‘the potential for the interests of the
advocating government and the business partners to dominate over the
public interest has been palpable’ (Hodge & Greve 2010, p. S8).
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Table 1.3: Current market capitalisation of major assets
Company name $ million
Qantas 2,668.54
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 122,490.50
Telstra 64,703.99
Suncorp 16,133.98
Tabcorp 2,715.39
Total 208,712.40
Source: www.bloomberg.com, valuation at 14 February 2014
In the shadows: marketisation in social services
Asset sales appear as highly visible lump sums on the revenue side
of the public ledger. And, Australians are aware of changes in service
arrangements in new privatised banks, airlines, utilities, and telecom-
munication carriers. Are techniques involved in the marketisation of
social services so obvious? The answer is no: measures such as contract-
ing out (outsourcing) or tax expenditures to support market provision
are much less visible. One reason is that contracting out appears on the
expenditure side of the public ledger, often as part of program outlays
and recorded in ways that do not make clear who the government is
paying to provide services. Tax expenditures are particularly opaque.
Not reported in the budget at all,10 revenue is ‘forgone’ in the form of
tax concessions to individuals and companies.
Marketisation of social services is different from asset sales in an-
other important way. Most of the assets sold by governments in recent
decades provided services for which payments by consumers (whether
households or industry) covered the costs of production, and in many
cases delivered a surplus to the public purse. Public ownership dealt
with the problem of natural monopolies, distributing the surpluses of
production to consumers and businesses that would have otherwise
10 Tax expenditures are reported separately in Treasury’s annual Tax expenditure
statements.
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accrued as monopolistic profits. Many social services are different: con-
sumers (generally households or individuals) typically do not pay the
full cost of production; indeed, they may pay relatively little. Such
services are publicly subsidised for social purposes; in other words,
redistribution is an essential feature of their design. They are social in-
frastructure that enables labour market and community participation
(for example, of parents of young children and family members of frail
older people and people with disabilities), and that provides in-kind
specialised support to various vulnerable groups (for example, through
support to find work for unemployed people, welfare services for chil-
dren and families and residential care for older people) and to people
in crisis situations (for example, following natural disasters, droughts,
homelessness or domestic violence).
These characteristics affect the politics of social service marketisa-
tion in different ways. For example, services directed at smaller, disad-
vantaged groups such as unemployed people, are less likely to attract
widespread public attention, especially when the economy is growing,
so changes may not be registered, let alone resisted. Meanwhile, ser-
vices taken up across all social groups, such as child care and aged
care, have only quite recently, and partially, emerged as ‘public issues’
from their prior status as ‘personal troubles’, to use C. Wright Mills’s
well-known formulation. Thus, compared to universal services such
as health and education that have long been provided collectively, the
political salience of child care and aged care to broad publics is still
developing.
Regardless, profound shifts have occurred, and in what follows,
we point to a few major developments at the federal level11 to give a
sense of the changes that have introduced market practices and actors
into social services over the last two decades. We discuss child care,
employment services, superannuation, health care, aged care and ap-
proaches to the non-government sector. As pointed out in Goodwin
and Phillips (this volume), publicly subsidised social services have long
been provided by a range of mostly private (non-public) providers
in Australia. However, until relatively recently, the ‘mixed economy’
11 The state governments have primary responsibility for organising delivery of
many social services affected by the changes we discuss. Developments at the state
level are not chronicled here but deserve a definitive account.
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was not primarily coordinated by market instruments and incentives,
and the role of for-profit organisations was marginal or non-existent
in most policy areas. Other chapters in this volume, especially those
by Davidson (on community care), Stebbing (on retirement incomes),
Carney (which includes discussion of aged care), Proctor and Aitchison
(on schooling), Collyer, Harley and Short (on health care) and
Mitropoulos and Bryan (on a new financing method for social services)
fill out the account in detail.
Hawke and Keating’s welfare model: Labor engages private
services
The Hawke and Keating Labor governments made critical reforms to
social policy that increased involvement of private sector actors, both
non-profit and for-profit. Important for understanding Labor’s reforms
in these areas is that they were aimed at increasing the scale of service
provision without increasing the size of the public sector – although
public spending on key service areas did increase significantly. Using
the examples of child care, employment services, and retirement in-
come provision, we show how increased service provision was largely
achieved by promoting the growth of private sector alternatives to un-
derdeveloped public provision.
Child care had long been provided in a mixed economy, with some,
but not all, private providers, enjoying public subsidies. As Brennan
(1998; 2007) has documented, only non-profit and local government
providers were eligible for federal government funding under the terms
of the Child Care Act 1972. In limiting eligibility in this way, the then
Liberal government accepted the recommendation of early childhood
professionals that good quality care ‘was best provided in childcare cen-
tres under the auspices of non-profit organisations’ (Brennan 2007, p.
214) – market ideas were yet to influence this policy domain.
In the 1980s, Labor had changed the model of recurrent funding
for these services, in a bid to save money by reducing public spending
on what some in the government saw as unjustifiable support to the
middle class (Brennan 1998). Before this reform, funding levels had
been tied to actual staff costs, and so were formally linked to the costs
of providing services. The reforms, which were resisted by unions,
childcare workers and women’s groups, shifted the funding model to
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payment per licensed place. The new payment was not formally linked
to costs of provision, and this payment was supplemented by fee as-
sistance to low-income families. The new approach to funding services
delinked the level of public funding from the actual costs of provision,
and has been widely used to contain the public cost of social services
since the 1980s. User fees typically make up the difference between the
subsidy and the cost – a form of privatisation to households.
Other ALP reforms to child care further privatised the system by
promoting the expansion of for-profit provision. In 1991, the ALP gov-
ernment increased funding to child care by extending eligibility for
public subsidies to parents using for-profit providers. Brennan (1998)
has documented how this decision was a compromise, following in-
tense debate within the ALP, pressure from for-profit providers and
opposition from women’s groups.12 An important rationale for increas-
ing public funding for child care was Labor’s commitment to address-
ing child poverty; the rationales for the chosen measure – extending
subsidies to for-profit providers – included competitive neutrality and
the need to draw more capital into the sector (Brennan 2007, p. 215).
This round of changes shifted the financing mechanism from one which
primarily funded centres to provide services to one which primarily
funded parents to subsidise the costs of child care – effectively a
‘voucher system through the back door’ (Brennan 1998, p. 188). The
impact of these changes was immediate and profound. Between
1990–91 and 1995–96, the number of children using formal child care
grew from 153,100 to 570,300, and federal expenditure on child care
grew from $245.6 million to $990.6 million (Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare 1997, p. 111–12). Over the same period, the num-
ber of places in for-profit childcare centres increased from 36,700 to
122,462 (233 percent) while the number of places in community-based,
non-profit services increased from 39,567 to 45,601 (15 percent) (Bren-
nan 2007, p. 215).
12 The Minister of Finance, Peter Walsh, agreed with the for-profit providers that
a voucher system would be the best policy. For market champion Walsh, vouchers
would resolve the problems of inequity arising from the disproportionate use of
publicly subsidised child care by middle-class families. However, this policy was
not adopted (Brennan 1998).
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The ALP also sought to widen access and improve benefits without
establishing new public institutions in another social policy domain:
retirement incomes. In 1992, the government introduced compulsory
superannuation, thereby making occupational superannuation avail-
able to a much wider range of employees than previously (see Stebbing,
this volume, for a detailed analysis). During Whitlam’s leadership of
the ALP, a national (public) superannuation scheme was added to the
party’s platform in 1969, based on a collective logic. The ALP under
Hawke and Keating did not take this route, and the chosen instrument
led to the growth of a massive private funds management industry, un-
derpinned by public subsidies in the form of generous tax concessions.
Note, however, that non-profit industry super funds were an important
innovation of this time, and were the default funds for workers on in-
dustrial awards. With these industry funds, a vestige of an associational
logic was retained by the ALP’s reforms.
With its employment strategy, Working nation, released in 1994,
Labor sought to address the high unemployment of that time with a job
guarantee for the long-term unemployed and a more flexible model of
assistance to job-seekers in finding and training for work. This more
individualised assistance was to be achieved through specialised ‘case
management’ services, established as a complement to the mainstream
Commonwealth Employment Service. Case management would be of-
fered by a newly constituted public provider, Employment Assistance
Australia (EAA), along with services outsourced to non-government
organisations, both for-profit and non-profit. Contracts were allocated
following a tender procedure run by an independent regulator, with
competition between providers (including EAA) on quality, not price.
By 1996, 30 percent of case management services were offered by pri-
vate providers (Considine 2000, pp. 277–78; Considine 2003, p. 66).
In other policy domains, a similar pattern of a blend of social
democratic goals on one hand, and fiscal containment and the increas-
ing use of corporate/market mechanisms and private actors on the
other, is evident. In 1983, for example, Labor established Medicare, a
universal public health insurance system – to fund mostly privately al-
located, privately provided medical services. Meanwhile, in aged care,
earlier Liberal governments’ subsidies to residential care had promoted
open-ended, uncoordinated and inequitable development of the nurs-
ing home sector. Labor’s remedies for these problems combined bu-
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reaucratic (regional planning) and market (competitive tendering) log-
ics (Kendig & Duckett 2001; see Davidson, this volume for discussion
of developments in community care). As with asset sales and competi-
tion policy, many Labor reforms in the social services provided fertile
ground for more thoroughgoing marketisation by the Howard govern-
ment after 1996, and for the consolidation of for-profit provision in
many social service fields. Not least was the consolidation of new pri-
vate interests in social policy, interests that sought to keep funding
flowing and to contain regulation that might increase costs.13
In an overlapping set of developments, the way governments dealt
with non-government service providers also began to change signif-
icantly during the 1980s (see also Goodwin & Phillips, this volume,
for a more systematic treatment of this issue). As public spending on
social services increased and private providers were more systemati-
cally included in the welfare state, governments sought tighter control
over those providers. To this end, governments at federal, state and lo-
cal levels began to use a suite of corporate management technologies,
including program budgeting, performance measurement and corpo-
rate planning to arrange both their internal operations and their rela-
tionships with the private organisations they funded to provide social
services (Considine 1988; see also Healy 1988; Industry Commission
1996).14 As these approaches took hold and evolved over the subse-
13 Brennan (1998; 2007, p. 220) has shown, for example, how for-profit childcare
providers first successfully fought for access to public subsidies and then, often
successfully, resisted increased quality regulation.
14 The report of an inquiry into competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) by
public sector agencies, was commissioned by the ALP government and released in
early 1996. Section A. 1 of the report contains an excellent articulation of the
principles of public sector management and change abroad at the time. Section A.
2 showed that CTC accounted for a relatively small proportion of public spending
at that time. At the federal level, the Defence and Veterans Affairs departments
dominated CTC, measured by expenditure (Industry Commission 1996, pp.
60–61), while in New South Wales and Western Australia (the only states for
which detailed figures were given), CTC accounted for small but rapidly growing
proportions of spending – in NSW, 2.3 percent of expenditure was via CTC in
1992–93, rising to 4.0 percent in the following financial year. In WA the
proportion increased from 3.6 percent in 1992–93 to 7.6 percent in 1994–95
(Industry Commission 1996, p. 62).
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quent decades, they significantly changed the demands government
funders made on their ‘suppliers’.
Howard’s service marketisation: contracting out and tax
expenditures support private service industries
Outsourcing and competitive tendering developed apace during the
Howard years. Alongside asset sales, the Howard government out-
sourced information technology, human resources and knowledge ser-
vices in the federal bureaucracy. It was also very active in marketising
areas of social policy. The Hawke and Keating governments tended to
use marketising reform to expand service provision by using public
subsidies or legislation to increase services. By contrast, Howard’s poli-
cies tended to encourage the substitution of private provision or fund-
ing for public. In an analogue to its ambitions for ‘mum and dad’ share
ownership, the Howard government’s rationales for social service mar-
ketisation included enhancing individual choice. Promoting the growth
of the private sector’s share of provision was also an explicit policy goal.
Here we briefly outline some developments in child care, job placement
services, superannuation, health care and aged care, to demonstrate the
character of market reform of social services during the Howard years.
The extension of public subsidies to for-profit providers under La-
bor was a quick-fix solution to the problem of the undersupply of child
care, with an uneasy mix of rationales. The Coalition government’s ap-
proach to child care funding was more unequivocal in its promotion
of a market-driven system – albeit one that provided large and grow-
ing public subsidies to the families targeted by Howard’s politics, which
also emphasised traditional gender roles and extended social benefits to
those on higher incomes.
In its first budget, the government reduced and restructured child
care funding. It removed the operational and capital subsidies to non-
profit, community-based child care services despite promises not to do
so before the election, reduced the level of one form of child care sub-
sidy to parents, and imposed a means tests on the other (Brennan 2007,
p. 216). However, new funding arrangements brought in as part of the
New Tax System in 2000 increased the Child Care Benefit (CCB) paid to
parents, and increased the eligibility threshold for this benefit. In 2004
– an election year – a further subsidy was introduced, in the form of a
1 The politics of market encroachment
55
tax expenditure: the Child Care Tax Rebate (CCTR), which subsidises
parents’ out-of-pocket expenditure on child care. While the CCB was
means-tested and cut out for families above a certain income threshold,
the CCTR was capped but not means-tested. The CCTR considerably
reduced the extent of targeting of child care benefits, and injected yet
more funds into the system.
The further injection of funds into an unplanned system, which
had relatively undemanding quality regulation and no cap on fees,
created favourable conditions for the further expansion and corporati-
sation of for-profit provision. A spectacular example of the business
opportunity apparently offered by the new funding regime was the rise
of ABC Learning. Listed on the stock exchange with 43 centres in 2001,
in 2007 it owned 2,323 centres, of which 1,095 were in Australia, fol-
lowing a building program and the aggressive pursuit of acquisitions
(Newberry & Brennan 2013). At its high point, ABC Learning was the
world’s largest child care company. Along the way, owner Eddie Groves
made close relationships, including business deals, with several leading
Coalition politicians; indeed, Larry Anthony, the Howard government’s
minister for Children and Youth Affairs joined the board of the com-
pany as a non-executive director within months of losing his seat at
the 2004 election (Brennan 2007, p. 218). Critics have pointed out how
policies championed as fostering competition and choice in child care
instead led to strong market concentration and price inflation (New-
berry & Brennan 2013).
Earlier in the 1990s, Labor’s Working nation expressed a mix of
social democratic and marketising impulses, and began the process
of contracting out job placement services. The Howard government’s
reform of labour market programs removed the social democratic el-
ements, notably the job guarantee, and, as Mark Considine puts it,
involved ‘radical changes … to strengthen the market elements of this
service’ (2003, p. 66). Using the now ritual criticisms market reformers
use to justify policy change, the government claimed its evidence-based
labour market programs were addressing the ‘inflexibility, lack of
choice and diversity, the absence of competition and unclear objectives
and outcomes’ of the ALP’s Working nation (cited in Thomas 2007, p.
10). In 1998, the ‘Job Network’ was created and all publicly funded
job placement services to recipients of income support were put out to
competitive tender. The CES and EAA were closed down, and replaced
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for the time being by a new public entity, Employment National, which
competed alongside private providers. Over two rounds of contracting
in 1998 and 2000, Employment National’s share fell to below 10 percent,
and at the third round in 2003, all contracts went to private providers
(Thomas 2007).15
The Howard government also made a large number of reforms
to superannuation policy during its period in office, not all in the
same direction.16 Some early measures sought to decrease inequities in
the system arising from the compulsory nature of the Superannuation
Guarantee, which removed urgently required money from the pockets
of people on very low incomes, and from the very longstanding and re-
gressive tax concessions on super contributions, which Labor had not
remedied. There were also several measures designed to improve the
sustainability of the system, such as increasing the preservation age,
and removing disincentives for older people to remain in paid employ-
ment. However, the main thrusts of superannuation policy during the
Howard years, especially later on, were to enhance the business op-
portunities of private financial institutions and to increase the benefits
received by a core constituency of wealthy voters (see Stebbing, this vol-
ume).
The idea of enhancing choice was a key rationale behind the two
main reforms that both increased the scope of for-profit private super-
annuation and reframed superannuation as a financial services ‘prod-
uct’ directed at ‘customers’. The first was the Retirement Savings Account
Act 1997, which enabled a wide range of financial institutions to offer
alternatives to trustee-controlled superannuation funds, thereby open-
ing up a tax-expenditure-subsidised business opportunity to private
banks. These opportunities increased when, after a long gestation, leg-
islation was passed to enable employees to nominate any eligible super-
15 The Coalition introduced competition over price as well as quality into the
tender processes of 1998 and 2000, but removed price in 2003 because it was
evidently counterproductive (Thomas 2007, pp. 2, 19). Over time, detailed control
over providers increased, in the attempt to deal with the predictable problems of
‘parking’ of hard-to-place clients and selection bias towards easier-to-place clients
(‘creaming’) that arise in marketised systems (Thomas 2007, p. 23).
16 For a comprehensive overview, see Warren (2008), from whom much of the
following is drawn.
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fund, rather than the default fund, in their industrial agreement from
2005 (Warren 2008, p. 18).
As noted above, early changes sought to decrease inequities arising
from concessional tax treatment of contributions to superannuation.
However, later changes reversed some progressive measures and, over-
all, significantly increased the inequity of superannuation arrange-
ments.17 The government argued that the changes would ‘dramatically
simplify superannuation for retirees and improve incentives to work
and save’ (Australian Government 2006, p. 9). The government abol-
ished the tax surcharge on superannuation contributions by high-in-
come earners it had introduced in its first budget, removed all taxes
on superannuation benefits, and extended arrangements that permitted
sharing of entitlements with spouses, which offered significant benefits
to high-income breadwinner households. One consequence was the
very steep climb in the costs of revenue forgone in tax expenditures
during the final years of Howard rule (see Table 1.4).
Increasing choice was also an important justification for Coalition
reforms in health policy. In opposition, the Coalition had long opposed
universal health insurance: the Fraser government abolished the Whit-
lam government’s Medibank, and Medicare was an opposition target
during the Hawke and Keating governments. In 1995, however, Howard
changed his mind – for electoral, not ideological reasons. As he put it
to his biographers, Wayne Errington and Peter van Onselen:
I think that there is a certain bedrock statism in the Australian psy-
che. I came to the conclusion that the public would never let us get
rid of Medicare and we had to accept the public wanted it and what
our responsibility was to try and build on it and develop up the poli-
cies and build around Medicare (2007, p. 228).
Accordingly, Medicare was not retrenched after the election of the
Howard government. Instead, the Coalition offered support for private
17 Measures to encourage low-income earners to contribute to their own
superannuation were retained, but were marginal beside the benefits that flowed to
high-income earners. It is also important to note that the ALP did not remove
regressive concessional treatment of superannuation contributions that had
existed for many decades.
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alternatives to Medicare, in the form of a 30 percent rebate on private
health insurance premiums in 1999. The goals were to revitalise the
rate of private health insurance, which had declined significantly since
the introduction of Medicare, and, as noted, to enhance choice. To de-
fray public opposition, the Coalition framed the rebate as a support for
Medicare itself, by diagnosing an ‘unsustainable pressure’ on the public
system, to be relieved not by increasing funds to that system, but rather
by subsidising private alternatives (Elliott 2006). In 2004, an election
year, in the attempt to shore up support of another key Howard con-
stituency – older Australians – the rate of the rebate was increased to 35
percent for people between 65 and 70 years old, and to 40 percent for
those aged over 70.
One reason why older people might have needed a sweetener of
this kind is that, on the recommendation of the National Commission
of Audit in 1996, the Howard government sought to bring a different
marketising instrument into aged care policy: user pays. The first Coali-
tion budget brought in user fees for the first time for services under
the Home and Community Care program, and new means tests were
introduced and fees increased in residential care in 1997. The most
controversial change was the introduction of ‘accommodation bonds’,
which bring in service user resources to fund capital deficits in residen-
tial care. This measure was strongly resisted by older people and their
families, who feared that they would have to sell the family home to
gain access to the care they needed (Fine & Chalmers 2000, p. 11).
Also introduced in 1997 was a policy designed to enable those with
more resources to pay more to get more within publicly subsidised res-
idential care. Providers would be able to offer ‘extra service’ facilities
or wings, to ‘enable residents in aged care services to enjoy a superior
level of comfort and choice’ (Department of Health and Ageing 2005,
cited in Buckmaster 2005, p. 3). While fees, subsidies and standards
for care remained set by the government, proprietors could set their
own charges for service dimensions, such as accommodation, food and
recreational and personal services. This measure was a deliberate at-
tempt to engender stratification within aged care, and opened a lucra-
tive business opportunity in which corporate providers were particu-
larly interested (Buckmaster 2005, p. 4).
Across most social policy fields, the government took a similar
approach. For example, federal funds for private schools were also in-
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creased and funding rules relaxed, which the government justified as
enhancing educational choice and which lead to significant growth of
private education. This, along with changes to the range of policies
already discussed, exemplifies some key themes and instruments in
Coalition social policy. Promoting private alternatives to public provi-
sion, justified as enhancing self-reliance and consumer choice is one;
another is the use of tax expenditures as a social policy instrument, not
least to extend benefits to higher income households previously ineligi-
ble for support within Australia’s targeted welfare model. By the end of
the Howard era, private provision of social services had increased con-
siderably, as had the share of for-profit companies within the private
sector, and stratification in education, health care and aged care had
been actively engendered by public policy. Further, despite the focus
on cost containment in many policy areas, the extent of public involve-
ment in social policy, as measured by spending, had not shrunk by
2007; indeed, quite the reverse, it had expanded – leading the Howard
government’s approach to be characterised as ‘big government conser-
vatism’ (Norton 2006).
One other result of the Howard approach to social policy deserves
mention. Conservatives are often thought to favour non-profit or non-
government organisations (NGOs) because they express a communi-
tarian spirit of self-help or, more paternalistically, a charitable impulse.
The Howard government certainly drew on these themes, with its
rhetoric of a ‘unique social coalition approach’ (cited in Phillips 2007,
p. 33), in engaging these organisations in service provision. Yet in re-
ality, the Coalition government’s relationship with NGOs was more
complex. On one hand, many non-profit organisations gained large
income streams from providing publicly funded services, in job place-
ment, homelessness, family relationship counselling and other areas.
On the other, in addition to the increasingly detailed control exercised
through contracting that began under the ALP, the Coalition govern-
ment was hostile to the advocacy role taken by some NGOs, which it
also sought to neutralise or control. Early in its period in office, the
government simply stopped federal funding to several advocacy NGOs
in the social welfare and environmental fields (Phillips 2006, p. 60),
and contracts with providers often included ‘gag clauses’ which sought
to prevent those receiving federal funds from criticising the govern-
ment (Franklin & Lunn 2008).18 Over time the Howard government
Markets, Rights and Power in Australian Social Policy
60
established a group of favoured – or perhaps captured – organisations,
many of them with a religious auspice (Phillips 2007). Meanwhile,
the rhetoric of ‘coalition’ notwithstanding, the non-profit sector was
damaged, with its capacity to act with an associational logic under-
mined by competition with other organisations (both non-profit and
for-profit), and by the highly instrumental nature of the contracting
process (Wright, Marston & McDonald 2011).
No turning back? Federal Labor and social services 2007–13
Labor’s election in 2007 marked a return to the revival of social de-
mocratic goals, although these were still pursued with market-inflected
strategies, as we shall show. ALP governments under Rudd (2007–10,
2013) and Gillard (2010–13) attempted major expansionary reforms of
health care, education, disability support and aged care. One challenge
for Labor in power was opposition from entrenched private interests
consolidated by Howard-era policies. Another was the federal structure
of governance in Australia, which became increasingly difficult to navi-
gate as more states came to have Liberal or Coalition governments over
Labor’s time in federal government. Yet another was that Labor’s ambi-
tious reform agenda was dogged by the perennial problem of Australia’s
‘low tax social democracy’ (Wilson 2013), which left the ALP without
the resources required to fully realise its reform goals.
But Labor had also been challenged in realising its social demo-
cratic goals by its own ideology, which has pulled it back towards
market-oriented policies and away from developing more collective
responses to social risks. A 2008 speech by the then Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Education, Employment and Workplace Rela-
tions,19 and later Prime Minister, Julia Gillard gives a sense of Labor’s
approach. Ms Gillard spoke about ‘the new politics of the progressive
centre’:
18 The Howard government also put forward a Charities Bill in 2003, which
sought to redefine the purpose of organisations with tax exemptions to exclude
those with political or advocacy purposes. The bill was not passed and was
withdrawn (Wright et al. 2011, p. 311).
19 Revealingly, Ms Gillard said she ‘would be happy to be described as “the
Minister for Productivity” ’ following her swearing in to this ‘very broad suite of
portfolios’ (Gillard 2008).
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The next generation of reform challenges are all about how the power
of the market interacts with the surrounding framework of insti-
tutions and the actions of individuals themselves. That means we
are focusing on the fundamentals of market design … How can we
develop markets which interact productively with strong public in-
stitutions and empower users to participate successfully in them?
(Gillard 2008)
Ms Gillard criticised the Howard government’s ‘version of being pro-
market’ for having little regard for the overall performance of sectors,
including health and education, in which it had simply encouraged the
growth of private providers and private consumption. But, she went on:
Rejecting this approach does not mean that we seek to control and
direct market activity from within government. Instead, we need to
ensure that, in sector after sector, the design of key institutions, the
shared investment in knowledge and skills and the approach taken to
regulation increase the distinctive strengths, innovative capacity and
adaptability of that field. (Gillard 2008)
Kevin Rudd expressed similar ‘Third Way’ ideas in his lengthy essay
on social democracy in 2009, in which he decried ‘neoliberalism, and
the market fundamentalism it had produced’, but also emphasised ‘the
creative agency of government’ in addressing social inequity and ‘re-
build[ing] confidence in properly regulated markets’ (Rudd 2009). A
brief overview of Labor policy on child care, schools and health illus-
trate how the ALP in government enacted this approach, within the
political and institutional constraints they faced.
Before the election in 2007 early childhood programs had a promi-
nent place in Labor’s campaign, in keeping with the ALP’s strong focus
on education as a means to social mobility for individuals and prosper-
ity for the nation. In its first budget, Labor increased the non-means-
tested tax rebate (CCTR) component of funding from 30 to 50 percent
of out-of-pocket expenses, and raised the annual per-child ceiling from
$4,354 to $7,500. This approach to increasing child care affordability
continued the inflationary and market-oriented approach of the Coali-
tion. Shortly after these changes were brought in, the Rudd government
was confronted by the collapse of ABC Learning – the corporate, for-
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profit provider that had grown to dominate long day care in Australia.
The government spent $100 million (in addition to its ongoing child
care funding) to prevent the sudden closure of such a large part of
the system (Newberry & Brennan 2013, p. 240).20 Eventually, much
of the child care provision part of ABC Learning was taken over by
a consortium of large, non-profit organisations, underpinned by loans
from the government and the NAB – and by capital from self-styled
philanthropic private investors, who are now pleased to report that
they receive a 12 percent return on their investment in the rebranded
‘Goodstart’ (Gorman 2013). The property in the centre buildings re-
mained in the hands of for-profit property trusts, as it had been under
ABC Learning (Newberry & Brennan 2013). Once the transfer of ABC
Learning centres to Goodstart had taken place, for-profit providers still
retained 64 percent of long day care places (Office of Early Childhood
Education and Care 2010, p. 6). Overall, then, Labor did not substan-
tially change the market structure, as predominantly for-profit private
providers, complex private business models and demand-side funding
were left in place.
However, social democratic goals also shaped the ALP’s approach
to child care, through policies aimed at increasing quality and acces-
sibility within this ‘market’. During its first term, Labor sought to use
regulation to increase staff: child ratios and the qualifications of staff
– both measures long resisted by for-profit providers – and to extend
the reach of national quality regulation to all forms of child care.21
Other measures included the guarantee of a part-time preschool place
to all four-year-olds in Australia and the development of a National
20 Newberry and Brennan (2013) give a fascinating account of the ‘opco-propco’
(operational company–property company) structure that enabled the growth, and
led to the demise of ABC Learning. This model of separation of operation and
property elements of the ‘business’ is still in place.
21 The Keating government had introduced an accreditation system for services
seeking access to federal subsidies, as a concession to researchers and non-profit
providers concerned about the quality of unregulated child care offered by
for-profit providers, which had gained access to public subsidies. During its
2007–13 term, Labor established a new national system (and institution) for
oversight of quality of all forms of publicly subsidised child care, including
preschool, long day care and out-of-school-hours care: the Australian Children’s
Education and Care Quality Authority.
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Early Years Learning Framework.22 A later intervention in 2013, the
‘Early Years Quality Fund’, offered $300 million over two years to fi-
nance wage increases for staff in long day care centres, in recognition of
the low pay and related retention problems in the sector. To access the
funds, providers were required to make enterprise bargains with staff
and United Voice, the relevant union.
In school education, Labor had to deal with the legacy of the
Howard government’s funding model, which had given substantial new
federal funding to private schools that, in turn, made many private
schools and many parents reluctant to see a more egalitarian redis-
tribution. During the 2004 election campaign, school funding policy
had been strongly contested. The then Labor leader, Mark Latham,
promised federal funding to schools on the basis of need, and created
a ‘hit list’ of 67 elite private schools from which a Labor government
would withdraw funding, for redirection to poorer schools (Harrison &
Hall 2012). Whether or not this declaration of so-called class warfare
and expression of the ‘politics of envy’ was decisive in the 2004 election
outcome (Harrison & Hall 2012; see Browne 2012), Labor was very
cautious during the 2007 campaign, promising to preserve the Howard
government’s arrangements for four years, and to conduct a review of
school funding. This review, chaired by David Gonski, was not commis-
sioned until April 2010 – nearly two and a half years after Labor had
been elected – and during the election campaign later that year, Labor
again promised to extend the existing inequitable arrangements (Har-
rison & Hall 2012). The committee finally delivered its report to the
government in December 2011, and the report, which recommended
sweeping changes to redress the significant inequalities it had identified
(Gonski 2011), was publicly released in February 2012.
Now constrained by its own promise to bring the budget into
surplus, the ALP baulked at implementing ‘Gonski’. On releasing the
report, the government re-emphasised the importance of education to
Australia’s economic future. But rather than taking the opportunity
provided by an authoritative report – and, likely, the support of the ma-
jority of the public (Browne 2012) – to act, it announced a yet further
round of consultation, and even proposed to look into whether philan-
22 See Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2009, p. 22) for a complete list
of Labor’s first term initiatives in this area.
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thropic funding might be a possible ‘alternative funding stream’ (Hall
2012).
The Australian Education Bill was introduced into parliament in
late November 2012, for implementation in 2014. In April 2013, the
government announced cuts of over $2 billion in university funding,
to release resources for schools. At the time of the federal election in
September 2013, plans for implementation were underway but incom-
plete, and a protracted process of haggling with the state and territory
governments, several of which were now in Coalition hands, was not
completed. In implementing the Gonski reforms, the federal ALP gov-
ernment sought to tie the states to increasing their own funding to
schools as a condition of receiving increased funds, among a range of
other measures included in a National Plan for School Improvement
(Harrington 2013). Thus it appears that Prime Minister Gillard was
hampered by political and fiscal problems in achieving her goals of
developing ‘markets that interact productively with strong public insti-
tutions’ and of redesigning ‘key institutions’ in the area of education.
Just as the Coalition’s private school funding seemed politically
difficult for Labor to reform, so too did the private health insurance re-
bate. The rebate ‘largely directed subsidies to those on higher incomes
who are more likely to take out PHI, and to private insurance compa-
nies, private hospitals and medical specialists’ (Segal 2004, p. 3; see also
Collyer et al., this volume), all of which have an interest in its contin-
uation.23 The benefits to these diverse recipients are handsome indeed:
the rebate amounted to $4.67 billion in revenue forgone in 2011–12, the
most recent year for which data are available (see Table 1.4). The ALP
had opposed the introduction of the rebate: during the debate on its in-
troduction, Jenny Macklin (1998) called it ‘the worst example of public
policy ever seen in this parliament’. However, once it had been intro-
duced, Labor did not take what it saw as the electoral risk of opposing
it, and Kevin Rudd promised to retain during the 2007 election cam-
paign.
23 Further, the rebate did not create a corresponding decline in demand for
public services, because people with private insurance retain full access to
Medicare, and around a quarter continue to present at public hospitals as public
patients (Seah, Cheong & Anstey 2013, pp. 1–2).
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Table 1.4: Tax expenditures for social purposes, Australia, 2000–12 ($m)
Superannuation Private
health
insurance
Housing Child care
2000–01 9,920 2,031 13,000
2001–02 11,140 2,118 13,000
2002–03 10,100 2,250 –
2003–04 13,833 2,387 14,000
2004–05 17,288 2,645 37,000
2005–06 23,305 2,883 39,500
2006–07 30,379 3,073 39,500
2007–08 38,940 3,587 40,500 75
2008–09 33,117 3,643 29,500 1,122
2009–10 25,413 4,262 43,500 1,072
2010–11 27,226 4,000 35,500 1,562
2011–12 30,262 4,671 31,000 1,887
2000–12
(total)
270,923 37,550 336,000 5,718
Source: Treasury tax expenditure statements, various years.
The need to find savings in the context of the GFC provided a po-
litical opportunity for reform after Labor came to office, and the Fairer
Private Health Insurance Incentives Bill, was introduced in 2009. La-
bor did not directly challenge the private health system with this bill:
Minister of Health, Nicola Roxon, avowed in her second reading speech
that ‘the government supports a mixed model of balanced private and
public health services’, and justified the changes as increasing the fair-
ness and sustainability of public subsidies to the private sector (Roxon
2009, p. 4435). The Coalition opposed the bill in the Senate, so it failed
to pass on two occasions (Biggs 2011, p. 5) and an amended version was
enacted in 2011, taking effect on 1 July 2012. Labor’s reform removed
one incentive for higher income earners to take out private insurance
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by means testing the rebate, but increased the other, by raising the
Medicare surcharge.
Public hospitals were also a politically charged issue at the 2007
election, and Kevin Rudd promised major reform, foreshadowing a
‘federal takeover’ of hospitals. A lengthy review and consultation
process resulted in a National Health Reform Agreement in 2011
(COAG 2011). Through this agreement, Labor aimed to steer state
governments by promising significant resource increases in return for
cooperation with new national institutions which would set a ‘national
efficient price’ for diagnosis-related activities in hospitals and monitor
hospital performance. This agreement continues the corporatisation of
the public sector, with its purchaser–provider split, benchmarking and
mix of decentralised budgets and centralised regulation – while also
conforming to Rudd and Gillard’s model of government steering by
regulation and market design.
We conclude this brief review of some of Labor’s social service re-
forms by noting that the ALP in government sought to redefine and
develop the relationship between the federal government and the non-
profit sector, following Howard government policy that had sought to
contain criticism and to control closely organisations under contract to
provide services. Early in its first term, Labor announced that it would
remove ‘gag clauses’ from federal government contracts, and promote a
more open policy debate with the non-profit sector (Franklin & Lunn
2008). In 2009, it commissioned the Productivity Commission to look
into the contribution of the non-profit sector, and a lengthy report
was published in 2010. In the following years, a set of new institutions
was established, including a National Compact between the federal
government and the non-profit sector in 2010, the Office for the Non-
Profit Sector in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 2011,
and the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission in 2012.
These institutions were designed to develop and support collaboration
between the government and non-government organisations (NGO)
(the Compact and Office) and to independently regulate non-profits
(the Commission). As researcher John Butcher has put it, whether these
efforts succeed in ‘putting the genie’ of the contracting state ‘back in
the bottle’ remains to be seen, given ‘the path-dependent legacies of two
decades of microeconomic reform’ (2011, p. 50).
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The ALP’s major social policy reforms confronted entrenched in-
terests, which it mostly failed to challenge head on. The major reforms
also had long implementation lead times, with the bulk of federal fund-
ing growth held over for several years from the time of the policy
announcement.24 This has left these reforms very vulnerable, following
the election of a Coalition government in September 2013.
The Abbott government
As noted above, long lead times on implementation of many of Labor’s
social policy measures made them vulnerable to retrenchment before
they were established. Evidence from the first 18 months of the Abbott
Coalition government (2013–) suggests that it will prevent many Labor
social policies from being fully implemented. The Coalition has justi-
fied many policy retrenchments with claims that Labor left the nation’s
finances in a poor state. Another rationale the Coalition invokes is the
need to remove unnecessary regulation imposed by an interfering ALP
government.
Far-reaching and more systematic marketising reform in social
services has been foreshadowed by the Abbott government under the
rubric of competition policy. In December 2013, the government an-
nounced a Competition Policy Review, and the draft report was re-
leased in September 2014. The report’s preoccupations and modes of
reasoning reflect confidence in market mechanisms and private provi-
sion, and suspicion of government regulation as burdensome and dis-
torting. According to the review panel, in the area of ‘human services’,
24 The hospital reforms begun by the Rudd government and finalised in 2011
when Julia Gillard was prime minister were to be fully implemented between 2014
and 2019, when an extra $16.4 billion would be spent on public hospitals (Coorey
2011). Only $11 million was allocated to DisabilityCare Australia in the budget of
2013–14, the fiscal year during which the scheme was announced after a long
gestation that included an inquiry by the Productivity Commission. Only in
2016–17, the last year of the forward estimates period, would significant federal
funding of $1.5 billion be allocated (Treasury 2013a, p. 140). The 2013–14 Budget
also allocated ‘an additional $9.8 billion over six years to implement a new
needs-based funding model for schools, as part of the National Plan for School
Improvement’, less than $1 billion of which was to be paid out before July 2015
(Treasury 2013a, p. 120).
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‘deepening and extending competition policy … is a priority reform.
Removing barriers to entry can stimulate a diversity of providers, which
is a prerequisite for expanding user choice’ (Competition Policy Re-
view 2014, p. 26). The report proposed a virtual encyclopaedia of new
public management reforms for ‘social service markets’: separation of
funding, regulation and service provision, public-private partnerships,
contestable funding and consumer choice (Competition Policy Review
2014, Chapter 10).
In addition to sweeping approaches to market reform such as the
Commission of Audit and the Competition Policy Review, the Abbott
government has also proposed change in several of the specific fields
this chapter has been tracking. In the area of child care, as part of his
bid to attract more women voters, Mr Abbott said before the election
that one of his first acts in a Coalition government would be to ask the
Productivity Commission to explore the costs of subsidising in-home
child care by nannies (Peatling 2012). At the time, Labor criticised this
proposal to fund the most private of all forms of child care as ineq-
uitable and unsustainably expensive, and child care experts expressed
concern about how the quality of private, home-based child care could
be ensured. Such an inquiry was commissioned in November 2013,
with terms of reference honouring Mr Abbott’s promise. In turn, the
draft report of the inquiry, released in October 2014, recommended
that ‘approved nannies to become an eligible service for which families
can receive ECEC assistance’ (Productivity Commission 2014, p. 48).
Meanwhile, on 10 December 2013, the government announced
that it would not honour the previous ALP government’s contracts
with childcare providers to increase childcare workers’ wages, under
the $300 million scheme mentioned above. Two days later, the govern-
ment announced that it would stop a much larger Labor scheme worth
$1.2 billion to increase wages in aged care, introduced as part of the
ALP’s large-scale reform in that area. The motivation is at least partly
political: during the election campaign, the Coalition had characterised
this scheme as a means to increase union membership, because like the
child care scheme, it also required providers to enter into enterprise
bargaining agreements to access the funds (Harrison 2013).
In the area of superannuation, the Coalition is also seeking to
reduce the power of unions, through proposed changes to the compo-
sition of the boards of trustees of non-profit industry superannuation
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funds. Currently, the boards of industry superannuation funds include
an equal number of representatives of employers and employees, with
the latter usually appointed by relevant unions. The Coalition and rep-
resentatives of for-profit providers position unions as ‘special interests’
in this role, and changes under consideration would require union
nominees to be replaced by ‘independent’ directors (Tingle & Patten
2013; Treasury 2013b). The Coalition is also seeking to give greater
access to for-profit providers to compulsory superannuation contribu-
tions made on behalf of workers on awards. Currently, default funds
in awards are specified by Fair Work Australia, and in the majority
(70 percent) of cases, the default funds are industry superfunds (Pro-
ductivity Commission 2012, p. 33). The Coalition has opposed this
arrangement as an ‘anti-competitive closed shop’ (Coalition 2013a, p.
8), and for-profit providers have been lobbying for access to this ‘mar-
ket’, from which they argue they are currently ‘locked out’ (Financial
Services Council 2012, p. 4). Both the Coalition and for-profit providers
propose removing deliberation within Fair Work Australia from the
process of designating default funds in awards. Instead, they argue
that employers should be able to choose any eligible fund on behalf of
employees who do not choose themselves. It is notable that industry
superfunds have long demonstrated superior performance, on average,
compared to for-profit funds (Productivity Commission 2012, p. 73)
and that the Coalition does not frame for-profit providers as a ‘special
interest’ in the superannuation field.
The Coalition has also foreshadowed or attempted other reversals
of Labor social policies discussed above. Before the election, the Coali-
tion had promised to reverse the ALP’s reforms of the private health
insurance rebate ‘once fiscal circumstances allow’ (Coalition 2013b).
At the time of writing, the means test and tax surcharge for private
health insurance also remained in place for high-income earners. And
although not foreshadowed in its campaign materials, changes to
Medicare have also been raised since the Coalition assumed office.
In February 2014, the then Health Minister, Peter Dutton, echoing
John Howard, called for increasing private contributions to the costs of
health care as a strategy for ‘modernising and strengthening Medicare’,
and making it more ‘sustainable’ (Dutton 2014). This is despite evidence
that both total health expenditure and public health expenditure in
Australia are comparatively low, which suggests that sustainability
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problems are not acute. Expenditure data notwithstanding, out-of-
pocket contributions by patients – which the government has sought to
increase – are already comparatively high (OECD 2013). After legisla-
tive setbacks in 2014 and a retreat on an administrative manoeuvre to
introduce copayment in 2015, the future of the Coalition's plans is un-
clear.
The Coalition also promised to keep some major ALP initiatives
before it was elected. Mr Abbott and then Shadow Education Minister,
Christopher Pyne, promised to honour Labor’s school funding policy,
calling it a ‘unity ticket’. Once in government, however, the Coalition
changed its mind on this question – more than once. At the end of
November 2013, now Minister for Education, Christopher Pyne, an-
nounced that school funding agreements that Labor had come to with
several states would be honoured in 2014 only, and a new funding
system would be implemented in 2015, modelled on the Howard gov-
ernment’s approach. A week later, the government had retracted this
proposal, following strong criticism, including from Coalition Min-
isters of Education in Victoria and NSW (Hurst 2013). The revised
position retained the expenditure Labor promised, but Mr Pyne pro-
posed to remove important conditions required in Labor’s agreements.
One that has definitely been removed is the requirement that states
also contribute additional funds, to ensure a net increase in education
spending. At the time of writing, the fate of the needs-based formula
for distribution of funds, which was at the heart of the Gonski report’s
recommendations for redressing inequality, was at best uncertain.
The Coalition has been active in the area of government–third sec-
tor relations, too. Before the election, it promised to abolish the Chari-
ties and Not-For-Profits Commission, established by Labor in 2012. In
a speech reiterating the promise in January 2014, the then Minister for
Social Services Kevin Andrews argued that the commission ‘imposes
an unnecessary and ponderous compliance burden on the sector’. In-
stead, he proposed a US-style ‘centre of excellence’ to replace ‘coercive
compliance and regulation’ with ‘collaborative education, training and
development’ (Andrews 2014). Like many of the Abbott government's
social policy measures, legislation abolishing the commission was not
passed by the Senate during 2014.
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Problems of marketised social services in Australia
The encroachment of market ideas and practices into Australia’s social
service system has raised a new set of problems for governments and
public.
First, governments have often used market practices to save money,
leaving services systematically underfunded. Unmet demand – whether
for child care, aged care, high quality schooling, timely medical treat-
ment or genuinely individualised labour market support – is one result;
a second is on the supply side, expressed in the low pay, high turnover
and often inadequate level of training in the social services workforce.
Second, in several policy areas, notably health, education, child
care and aged care, public underfunding combines with choice-co-
ordinated provision to generate significant inequality. Market-derived
rationales of increasing choice, diversity and competition in social ser-
vices justify public subsidies to a wide range of private providers, both
non-profit and for-profit, often without appropriate system planning
or scrutiny. Moreover, a patchwork approach to services weakens pro-
grammatic responses to complex welfare problems. In this kind of
mixed economy of social services, people with more resources may opt
out of the public sector and purchase private services, which are re-
sourced by a combination of public subsidies and their own funds. This
has clearly happened in school education in Australia, for example. The
result can be a vicious cycle of public sector decline, as underfunded
public services become services for the poor, and a two-tiered system
emerges.
Third, there is substantial international evidence that for-profit or-
ganisations, especially corporations, provide social services that are, on
average, lower quality than those provided by public or non-profit or-
ganisations (Meagher & Cortis 2009; Harrington et al. 2012). In child
care and residential aged care, where public provision is vestigial at best
in Australia, the risk of poor quality services for the poor is more likely
to arise in the for-profit sector, where lean service subsidies, weak con-
sumer efficacy and the profit motive are combined. Meanwhile, those
with more resources can pay more to escape both public services and
poor quality private ones. Here the conflict between the logic of the
market and the nature of social services seems most acute.
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Fourth, there is the problem of ensuring that services in marketised
social service systems are of good quality. As Braithwaite, Makkai and
Braithwaite (2007, p. 219) argue in their book about regulating resi-
dential aged care, as for-profit provision has displaced non-profit pro-
vision in Australia and elsewhere, ‘the density of rules and resources to
enforce them has increased’. And as this regulatory apparatus has in-
creased, so have the problems of ritualistic compliance and regulatory
capture, as private providers seek to limit the impact of quality controls
on their cost structures.
Fifth, the ABC Learning case provides spectacular evidence of the
instability that can also arise in service systems driven by a mixture of
consumer choice, public subsidy and the profit motive. Where the pri-
mary interest of corporate entities in marketisation is in gaining access
to lucrative government contracts or subsidies and maximising share-
holder return, privately provided services can lose the features expected
of public services: equal treatment, uncompromised commitment to
needs, and stable provision over time.
Sixth, while less spectacular than corporate collapses, reports of
fraudulent conduct by private contractors point to another systematic
problem in marketised service arrangements. Reports of pervasive
fraud by providers of publicly funded employment placement services
under the Job Network and its successor, Job Services Australia, have
recurred over more than a decade (Besser 2011, 2012; Marris 2001;
Morris 2007), and have involved both for-profit and non-profit
providers. Problems have also been reported in aged care – an internal
departmental audit was reported to have found that one in six claims
for a government subsidy for nursing home residents had over-charged
(‘Nursing home rorts clawback’ 2012). Likely to be much less prevalent
because of the design of the funding system, problems have also been
revealed in the child care sector. A report from the Australian Crime
Commission noted that ‘There are increasing instances of child care
benefit fraud schemes perpetrated by the owners of child care centres
by means of lodging fraudulent statements of child care usage to the
Family Assistance Office’ (cited in Viellaris 2013).
Seventh, as we noted in Table 1.1, in marketised systems, govern-
ments under political pressure can shift responsibility for service fail-
ures to private providers. This raises pressing questions of democratic
accountability for social provision – the public are repositioned as cus-
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tomers and governments as purchasers; meanwhile private providers
can simply close their business and move on.
Voters’ responses to marketisation: support for a mixed economy
of ownership and services with a leading role for government
Our account of asset sales and market encroachment into social ser-
vices in Australia has focused on the role of political, bureaucratic and
corporate elites, and we have mentioned public opinion only in pass-
ing. Our focus now turns to how Australian voters have responded.
That market encroachment is an elite project does not mean that voters
are irrelevant to shaping the course and limits of privatisation in rich
democracies.
Voter opinions are only one source of information about public
policy institutions and social policy arrangements, but they are an im-
portant one. This is because understanding how elite-driven policies are
‘institutionalised’ involves some consideration of the role of ‘political
feedback’ in policy change. The failures of some attempts at large-
scale privatisation – such as Thatcher’s efforts with the UK National
Health Service – to survive major political and economic tests are
important examples of such feedback. In developing countries, utility
privatisations (water, gas) have led to powerful conflicts and opposing
coalitions that hint at doubts about the future for privatisation, even
in rich democracies (see Hall, Lobina & Motte 2005). Recent bank
and commercial nationalisations during the Global Financial Crisis are
reminders of the endemic risks of a highly privatised economy. By con-
sidering what mix of government and private involvement the public
prefers we gain a useful picture of what arrangements are widely ac-
cepted and where possible tension points between policymakers and
the public over privatisation lie.
We begin with public attitudes to ownership of enterprises and in-
stitutions and public attitudes to who is best suited to deliver social
services. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 present findings from the Australian Survey
of Social Attitudes in 2003 (Wilson et al. 2004) and 2009 (Evans 2010)
about the preferred mix of government/private involvement in major
enterprises, institutions and services.
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Table 1.5: Preferences for ownership of major enterprises and institutions, 2003,
percent
Public Mix public
and private
Private Can't choose
Australia Post 67 24 5 3
Prisons 67 19 8 6
Public trans-
port systems
in cities
63 28 6 3
The electricity
system
60 31 9 6
Telstra 57 31 9 4
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2003 (n>2,114) Question: Do you
think the following enterprises or organisations should be in public ownership,
private ownership or a mix of public and private ownership?
As Table 1.5 shows, in 2003, public ownership was preferred by
Australians in all five areas surveyed, with support ranging from a low
of 57 percent for Telstra to a high of 67 percent for (still government-
owned) Australia Post and prisons (in which there is limited private
involvement). There was some support (low 30s) for partial private
ownership of Telstra and electricity; as discussed earlier, both types of
utility had been steadily privatised over the 1990s and 2000s. Still, sup-
port for fully private ownership remained extremely low in 2003 – less
than 10 percent across all five enterprises and institutions.
Table 1.6 gives us a better picture of support for private delivery
of social services. Government is the widely preferred provider of edu-
cation and health services, with nearly nine in 10 voters thinking that
governments are best suited to deliver in health services. When we con-
sider social and community services – including care for people with a
disability, child care, elder care, and employment and welfare support
– a slightly different picture emerges. Governments are considered by
small majorities to be best suited to deliver care for older people and
people with disabilities. Government leads ‘best suited’ responses by a
plurality of respondents for the other two service categories – services
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for job-seekers and child care. Community organisations and large
charities, which became major institutions under the Howard govern-
ment’s social services and welfare model, are preferred by 44 percent
of respondents as the best providers of counselling and welfare sup-
port. Business involvement in social services gain greatest recognition
in the area of employment services (36 percent) where they have played
a major role in service provision since the privatisation of the Com-
monwealth Employment Service.
All in all, support for non-public involvement in social and com-
munity service provision is higher, for several reasons. The first is that
many of these services have not traditionally been provided as public
services. Rather, as discussed earlier, they have expanded at a time when
direct government provision is distinctly out-of-favour among policy-
makers. One finding in political and policy science is that stable policy
institutions and arrangement will gather natural ‘constituencies’ (Pier-
son 1996, p. 147); no doubt the prior evolution of the mixed economy
of social service provision has influenced public support. But these
areas of provision are also ones that not only invite strong contest
between state and market provision, but also conflict between govern-
ment and family – social norms still sanction care for children, people
with disabilities and the elderly within private family settings. None
of these observations should discount one other finding that, when
views about these five social services are averaged, government still
leads as best provider with 45 percent of responses. Only when scores
for the community sector and family are combined does the number
of respondents preferring non-government delivery arrive at a sim-
ilar percentage. Given growing business interest and involvement in
welfare, it is useful to note that business is clearly the least preferred
provider; why this is the case should be the subject of further research.
Support for, and opposition to, privatisation
As we have noted, elite enthusiasm for privatisation has not rubbed off
on voters – even when they have had years of experience of privatised
services. Existing research (looking at data similar to ours) suggests that
opposition to privatisation started to grow in the 1990s and has re-
mained consistent and relatively stable since then (Pusey & Turnbull
2005, pp. 165–6). In this section, we draw on other survey research and
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Table 1.6: Preferences for delivery of health, education and social services, 2009,
percent
Governments Community
organisa-
tions incl.
churches and
charities
Businesses Families
and
relatives
Can't
choose
Health
services
87 4 5 1 3
Education 85 7 2 2 4
Care for the
disabled
51 24 4 10 6
Care for
elderly
persons
50 23 4 16 6
Services for
job-seekers
47 11 36 1 5
Counselling
or welfare
support
42 44 5 3 6
Child care 36 20 18 21 6
Average
social
services
(last 5
rows) 45 24 13 21 6
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2009 (n>3,243) Question: In general
who do you think is best suited to deliver the following services?
opinion poll data to explore attitudes to privatisation in further detail.
We show that recent data further confirm Pusey and Turnbull’s find-
ings, and suggest that a ‘new constituency’ of voters who have adapted
to and warmed to privatisation is yet to arrive. Figure 1.1 presents
responses to the AuSSA 2009 question ‘Privatisation of government
services has more benefits than costs’.
Results show that less than 20 percent of respondents support the
proposition that the benefits of privatisation outweigh the costs. A ma-
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Figure 1.1: Perceptions of the costs and benefits of privatisation, 2009, percent
Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2009 (n=3,097) Question: Privatisa-
tion of government services has more benefits than costs.
jority (53 percent) view privatisation as having more costs. Around 27
percent of respondents seemed to have mixed or unclear views, not
supporting either proposition or not choosing – a relatively high num-
ber which we discuss further below. Still, the balance of opinion among
those who express a clear view (by agreeing or disagreeing) is clearly
opposed to privatisation.
Widespread scepticism about privatisation as a general policy ap-
proach persists. In January 2014, a public opinion poll reached very
similar findings to the AuSSA survey. In response to the question ‘Gen-
erally, do you think that privatisation – that is, having public services
owned or run by private companies – is a good or bad idea?’, a majority
– 59 percent – thought privatisation a bad idea while only 21 percent
thought it a good idea (Essential Research 2014). The remainder did not
know.
A poll in February 2015 confirmed this general finding, and gives
more clues as to why Australians are sceptical about privatisation (Es-
sential Media Communications 2015, p. 13). The poll clearly shows that
voters don't believe that private ownership will bring lower prices, more
competition or better quality services – the main and long-standing
claims of proponents of privatisation. And respondents are clear about
who they think does gain – 70 percent say that the corporate sector
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mainly benefits while just 25 percent agree that privatisation helps the
economy.
Support for privatisation by social group
Durant and Legge’s (2002) study of privatisation views among French
voters found that the political and ideological orientations of voters
were particularly important. We used data from AuSSA 2009 to see if
similar political divides emerge among Australian voters. In addition
to the variables included in the French study, we also had a hunch that
‘nationalistic’ orientations played a role in cleavages over privatisation;
that is, that voters wanted big public institutions like utilities to be un-
der Australian control, whether public or private. AuSSA 2009 did not
include questions measuring nationalist policy stances, so we used the
privatisation data in AuSSA 2005 and compared views based on re-
sponses to a question seeking views as to whether foreign competition
had a bad effect on job security. We considered voters who agreed with
this question more likely to be ‘economic nationalists’.
Figure 1.2 ranks net support for privatisation for a range of differ-
ent constituencies available from data included in the Australian Survey
of Social Attitudes 2009. Net approval was calculated by subtracting to-
tal disapproval from total approval so that a negative score represents
more disapproval than approval. As is clear from the figure, none of
the constituencies included had a net positive view of privatisation, in-
cluding a range of groups typically associated with support for free
markets (shareowners, Liberal Party identifiers, voters identifying as
right of centre). Not surprisingly given the potential for windfall gains,
shareowners have the highest net support for privatisation at –20 per-
cent, though still well in negative territory and only narrowly ahead of
Liberal Party identifiers (–21 percent). However, much greater opposi-
tion was found among ‘economic nationalists’ (–43 percent), defined as
those with negative views of the impact of foreign competition on local
jobs, union members (–55 percent) and Australian Greens identifiers
(–60 percent). Within the Coalition’s base, National Party identifiers
had nine percent lower net approval (–30 percent) than Liberal identi-
fiers. Notably, young people, defined as between 18 and 35 years, had
slightly less negative views of privatisation than the average voter at –27
percent net approval. Young voters, having grown up in an ‘age of pri-
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Figure 1.2: Support for privatisation by key constituencies, 2009, net approval, per-
cent. For sources and notes, see appendix at the end of the chapter
vatisation’ may have fewer attachments to public ownership – a trend
that, if continued, might herald slowly rising toleration, if not accep-
tance, of privatised services.
Public responses to specific privatisations
To this point our analysis explores voter attitudes to privatisation at a
general level, without gauging views on specific proposals. This general
survey of opinion leaves unanswered two further questions – does the
general unpopularity of privatisation among voters translate into oppo-
sition for specific decisions to privatise major services? And, how does
voter support for privatisation of these services compare to other ma-
jor economic reforms? The commercial Essential Media online panel
survey of 1,017 voters from October 2011 helps with answers. Table 1.7
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shows voters’ assessments of a range of major economic decisions taken
by federal governments in the past few decades. Medicare achieves
strong support (net approval is 70 percent) and so does compulsory su-
perannuation for workers (72 percent). Although compulsory private
super conceals a form of privatisation in diverting worker funds to
financial markets, its ultimate popularity stems from its place as a man-
dated, universal means of financing retirement incomes. Immediately
obvious in Table 1.7 is the unpopularity of the sale of three major pub-
lic enterprises – Telstra, the Commonwealth Bank and Qantas – which
have a combined market capitalisation of approximately $190 billion (as
at February 2014; see Table 1.3 above) or around half of Australia’s net
public debt. These privatisations, all with net approval percentages be-
low minus 20 percent, rank well below the public’s evaluation of other
policy decisions, some of which are hardly free of ongoing unpopular-
ity and controversy (the Goods and Services Tax, for example).
Table 1.8 gives more detail about public opinion on these deci-
sions by respondent voting intentions. Confirming evidence from the
Australian Survey of Social Attitudes presented above, major privati-
sations register negative net approval from voters from all four main
political parties – Labor, Greens, National and Liberal. Liberal vot-
ers are not positive towards privatisation in retrospect. Rather, they
are the least negative, albeit only marginally when it comes to the
Commonwealth Bank and Qantas. National voters again break with
Liberals in holding stronger negative assessments of privatisation. On
this measure, Labor voters register stronger anti-privatisation views
than Greens (though both groups of voters are strongly hostile). By
contrast, responses to AuSSA 2009 on the general question suggested
Green identifiers are more hostile; it may be that Labor voters become
more critical when prompted about specific privatisation proposals. The
privatisation of Telstra was the most unpopular of the three, attracting
even –20 percent net approval from Liberals.
The same Essential Media poll asks respondents whether they
support reversing these decisions (see Table 1.9). With the exception of
boosting trade protection, the re-nationalisation of Telstra, Qantas and
Commonwealth Bank are the only other hypothetical policy reversals
that gain net approval from voters (between +5 and +14 percent). How-
ever, it should be noted that none of these three propositions reaches
majority support. Still, we can conclude there is a sizeable constituency
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Table 1.7: View of impact of major government decisions on Australia in 2011,
percent
Policy decision Good Bad Net approval
Compulsory super 79 7 +72
Medicare 76 6 +70
Floating the dollar 46 11 +35
Free trade agree-
ments
41 21 +20
Goods and ser-
vices tax
39 30 +9
Privatise Qantas 23 44 –21
Privatise the Com-
monwealth Bank
29 49 –21
Privatise Telstra 21 53 –32
Source: Essential Media (2011). Question (Very good–very bad; 5 points): ‘Think-
ing about some of the major decisions the federal government has made over
recent years, do you think the following decisions have been good for Australia or
bad for Australia?’. Net approval, or the balance of opinion, is calculated simply by
subtracting the percentage of those who responded that a decision was bad for
Australia from the percentage who responded that the decision was good.
Table 1.8: Attitudes to privatisation of major services by voting intentions in 2011,
percent (net approval)
Policy decision Labor Green Liberal National
Privatise Telstra –48 –33 –20 –36
Privatise Qantas –40 –26 –5 –14
Privatise Commonwealth Bank –36 –15 –1 –20
Source: Essential Media 2011, 24 October. Question: See Table 1.7.
in favour of re-nationalisation, perhaps surprising given that two of
these privatisations had been concluded by the mid-1990s. The poll also
asked respondents about two other hypothetical changes and the results
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Table 1.9: Support for reversing major government decisions in 2011, percent
Policy Reversal Support Oppose Difference
Increasing trade protection 59 20 +39
Buying back Telstra 47 33 +14
Buying back Qantas 44 34 +10
Buying back the Commonwealth Bank 41 36 +5
Abolishing the GST 35 43 –8
Regulating the dollar 32 42 –10
Voluntary super 24 64 –40
Privatising Medicare 10 73 –63
Source: Essential Media (2011), 24 October. Question (Strongly support–strongly
oppose; 4 points): ‘Would you support or oppose the federal government taking
any of the following decisions’.
place responses on re-nationalisation in a wider context. The hypothet-
icals are privatising Medicare, a major government service, and making
superannuation voluntary, which would make it once more a privilege
rather than a right. Table 1.9 shows that the privatisation of Medicare
would be extremely unpopular (–63 percent) as would be the ‘volun-
tarisation’ of super (–40 percent).
The future of privatisation of social services
Recent survey and polling evidence suggests that Australians disfavour
privatisation by a large margin. This unpopularity has occasionally
altered the pace and content of some privatisations; the examples of en-
suring majority Australian ownership of entities like Telstra and Qan-
tas,25 as well as the active promotion of participation of small share-
holders in the sale of Telstra, are examples of the impact of public opin-
25 In 2014, Prime Minister Abbott indicated that the government was prepared
to review the foreign ownership restrictions with which, he said, Qantas had been
‘shackled … by the Labor Party back in the 1990s’ (Binnie 2014).
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ion. Governments have also been punished for unannounced privatisa-
tions, particularly Anna Bligh’s Labor government which was sent into
opposition with just seven out of 89 seats in the March 2012 Queens-
land state election. And, electoral threats have occasionally caused pri-
vatisations to be postponed or abandoned; the retreat from the privati-
sation of the Snowy River hydroelectricity operations and Medibank
Private during the Howard Coalition government are two examples.
What is clear, however, is that privatisations are difficult to reverse
once they have happened. As Feigenbaum and Henig remark, privati-
sation policies ‘may engender new groups as well as behaviour, groups
endowed with powers that leave them entrenched and sometimes im-
possible to remove’ (1994, p. 208). Moreover, re-nationalisation is not
an active feature of the platforms of the social democratic and labour
parties anywhere in the rich democracies, although the Clark Labour
government (1999–2008) in New Zealand re-nationalised its accident
insurance scheme, Air New Zealand and New Zealand’s railway system
during its period in office. Major (temporary) nationalisations of an
assortment of banks, insurers, and car companies in the United King-
dom and the United States, during Gordon Brown’s period as Prime
Minister and Barack Obama’s period as President respectively, were not
commitments to public ownership but rather attempts to stabilise mar-
ket capitalism in the face of the Global Financial Crisis. Public policies
are typically shaped by an underlying policy paradigm (Dillon 1976).
The present paradigm provides a ‘warrant’ for private ownership of
major assets; contention over the consequences of private ownership
has not been sufficiently influential, or sufficiently grounded in organ-
ised, countervailing material interests, to tip policy orientations back
towards public ownership.
The same paradigm stabilises the drive for greater marketisation
of services: the prevailing view is that governments can do more, and
be better, by regulating markets for services currently provided by gov-
ernment (see Le Grand 2007; in Australia, Keating 2004). Australia has
been a leading ‘marketiser’ of services, even promoting international
emulation in some areas like case management and market-based em-
ployment services. Non-government provision of social services has
been institutionalised and extended further. Australia’s history of a
mixed economy of social services means there is an implicitly higher
baseline of public support for (or at least, reduced public opposition to)
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the development of community and private provision. One of the few
studies that touch on this subject gives other reasons for this apparent
support. Thompson and Elling (2000) show that, in the case of Michi-
gan voters, privatisation that favours non-profit organisations attracts
different constituencies and expectations than privatisation that favours
for-profit providers. Moreover, attitudes towards the community sector
are more positive than towards for-profit providers. Many on the left as
well as the right area are attracted to a ‘network society’ model of provi-
sion where localised, non-bureaucratic forms of care and assistance are
envisaged.
Conclusion
Early in the chapter, we outlined the internal and external pressures on
governments to sell assets and marketise service provision. In this con-
clusion, Table 1.10 draws together the threads of the two parts of the
chapter, setting out the pressures that might draw governments towards
marketising social service provision and those which might make mar-
ketisation a less attractive approach.
The creation of a successful ‘market’ of actors and organised in-
terests in social service provision is at the core of stable marketisation
processes. When governments can defray costs, do more with less, ‘rule’
through contracts, and impose standards on social service providers
and workers, the market model can be seen to have stabilising features
(squares 1 and 2). But the markets for social services can and will
change: small, community providers can be out-competed by large, for-
profit providers. These processes bring out inequalities in provision that
upset localised communities reliant on services, who are in turn capa-
ble of organising around their interests and raising the visibility of their
needs. Where powerful private providers dominate provision, and sub-
stantial inequities in access to and quality of services emerge, govern-
ments may have an interest in resuming direct provision or imposing
additional regulation (squares three and four), especially if contestation
of ‘market control’ becomes more organised and visible, and attaches
itself to paradigmatic activity aimed at redefining the value, role and
central place of direct public provision.
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Table 1.10: Competing pressures for greater market/government social service
provision
Internal (politics and
bureaucracy)
External (business,
consumers, voters, media)
Greater
market
provision
• Reduction of responsibility,
especially in difficult ser-
vice areas
• Cost control
• Overlapping business and
political networks favour-
ing marketisation
• Pre-existing markets for
service privatisation / lob-
bying for resources,
contracts
• Past successes in market
provision
• Client pressure for choice
and non-profit involvement
• Invisibility of the problems
of marketisation processes
to public scrutiny
• Powerful for-profit
providers ‘capture’ govern-
ment decision-making
Greater
government
provision
• Service / risk management
problems
• Budget protection by local
bureaucratic agencies
• Paradigmatic shifts in
favour of public provision
• Visible service and market
failure
• Inequities (and discrimina-
tion) in private delivery
• Cost increases from private
contracts
• Organised, visible resis-
tance to private provision
in favour of government
provision
Australian governments have enabled broad and deep market en-
croachment into Australian public institutions. This has been a bipar-
tisan project – up to a point. Labor governments have tended more
to pragmatic marketisation, while Liberal and Coalition governments
have sought more systematically to spread and consolidate market or-
ganisations and practices in Australian society. It is clear that, whether
bipartisan or not, marketisation is an elite project, and voter opposition
to its various policy expressions is widespread and longstanding. How
the tensions identified in Table 1.10 – not least those between public
and private sector elites on one hand and the public on the other – play
out will shape Australian social policy in the coming decades.
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Appendix
Sources and notes to Table 1.2.
Federal – Aulich and O’Flynn (2007a, Appendix 1 and 2); State – Re-
serve Bank of Australia (1997); Walker and Con Walker (2008); various
media reports.
(a) The party recorded is generally the party that decided/legislated the
privatisation; in some cases the actual sale occurred following a change
of government. The notes below record relevant cases and a divergence
from this rule.
(b) Process initiated/commitment made by National Governments
1996–98, but carried through by Labor into the 1999–2000 fiscal year.
(c) Partial privatisation proposed by ALP Premier Bannon before La-
bor lost power in 1992 – allocated to the incoming Liberal government
which sold the whole bank, since the size of the part Labor proposed
for retention is not known.
(d) Process begun under previous ALP premier, Joan Kirner, with the
proposed sale of one electricity generator in response to financial diffi-
culties.
Source and notes to Figure 1.2.
Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2009. Question:
(Agree–disagree) Privatisation of government services has more ben-
efits than costs. n=3097.net approval is calculated by subtracting total
disapproval from total approval so that a negative score represents more
disapproval than approval. High-income earners are defined as earning
$2,000 or more per week (n=219). * Australian Survey of Social Atti-
tudes 2005 data. Attitude question in the 2005 survey that was used to
define ‘economic nationalists’: ‘Many people today talk about Australia
becoming more closely linked to the outside world through trade, im-
migration and politics. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree
with each the following statements: Opening up Australia’s economy to
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foreign competition has a bad effect on job security in this country’;
‘economic nationalist’ respondents coded = Strongly agree + Agree.
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